26 Pressure groups
Moira Byrne
Key terms/names
collective action, disturbance theory, exchange theory, framing, incentives, insiders, outsiders and thresholders, political opportunity, population ecology, resource mobilisation theory, sectional interests
Introduction
Groups and movements that pressure governments, and political parties seeking government to change policy, are vital features of democracy.[1] Without the combined actions of people participating in groups and social movements, those who wish to hold office may not be aware of issues affecting constituents or how changes to policy may affect them.
Knowing about pressure groups is critical to understand democracy, government and policy making. This chapter discusses what pressure groups are, when they form, who joins them, how they work, and why they cease to exist. These considerations shine a light on some of the important theories of group power. The chapter also reflects on whether these groups are good for democracy and discusses the kinds of pressure groups that exist in Australia.
What are pressure groups?
Political scientists use a number of terms to refer to pressure groups, including interest groups, obby groups and advocacy groups .[2] In general, the term ‘pressure group’ refers to an organisation that pressures government to change policy, whether for their own interest or in the interest of others. A pressure group has some similarities to a political party in that it seeks to represent a sector of society and influence policy, but the key difference is that a pressure group does not seek to form government.[3]
An interest group is a type of pressure group that seeks to shape government policy in the interests of its members, while an advocacy group advocates for the interests of others. Some pressure groups are both interest groups and advocacy groups[4] in that they seek to advance both their own interests and those of other citizens.
What’s the difference between pressure groups and social movements?
Pressure groups differ from social movements because they are specifically organised to influence politicians and policy. In contrast, social movements evolve more organically and are less concerned with changing government policy than they are with changing society more broadly. Social movements may develop as a result of changing attitudes on an issue, or to provide the political voice required to address social exclusion. Movements can place grassroots pressure on politicians to change their position on a policy issue,[5] but pressuring governments is not their main reason for being. In essence, the identity of a social movement is formed solely in the community, and with reference to social change, rather than in relation to the state. Counter-movements is a term used to describe social movements that emerge in opposition to the opinions and beliefs of another social movement (for example, the men’s rights movement as a reaction to feminism).[6]
Collective action is intrinsic to pressure groups (and social movements) because citizens use group power to alter public policy.[7] Many activities of pressure groups and social movements may not be directly political, but interest groups spend at least some of their time and resources trying to influence public policy. This may occur through indirect methods such as networking or participating in government consultations, or through more direct methods such as electioneering or hiring professional lobbyists who are close to government decision makers, either geographically or politically.[8]
Although social movements and pressure groups are conceptually distinct, in practice, there is often considerable overlap between them. Often, what begins as a social movement later spawns pressure groups. Likewise, some groups that may form as pressure groups to address a policy issue may focus their effort on broad-scale mobilisation and changing public opinion as a way of bringing about the policy change they seek (i.e. a pressure group generates a social movement). For example, the campaign for same sex marriage in Australia began as a pressure group (stemming out of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex rights movement, which sought legal and policy change). As the quest for same sex marriage gained traction in the broader community, support for marriage equality became a social movement.
When do pressure groups form?
A number of theories seek to explain the formation of pressure groups. While these theories are explained separately, in practice, many factors affect the formation of pressure groups.
Disturbance theory
David Truman developed ‘disturbance theory’ after observing the way pressure groups formed in response to the growing complexity of society. Any disturbances arising in the community upset the balance within society. This in turn prompted pressure groups to form to oppose these threats to the status quo. Truman also noted that in almost all organised groups, an ‘active minority’ governed on behalf of the many.[9]
Population ecology and resource mobilisation theory
The theory of organisation population ecology sheds light on some of the limitations of disturbance theory. It emerged in the 1970s as scholars attempted to understand the way the politics of the day and the existence of other pressure group shaped the formation of new groups.[10] In particular, it recognised that the formation of new groups was affected by the number of other groups that already existed and the population density of these groups .[11] A pressure group may arise because a large number of people are committed to a particular cause in one location, yet a similar group committed to the same cause may flounder in another location because it does not offer a unique perspective, with existing groups already working to advance this cause. These groups frequently compete for the same resources, membership and funding, which links with resource mobilisation theory discussed in the social movements chapter.[12] Because pressure groups compete with each other, the existing density of groups in the population affects a new group’s prospect of formation.[13] Further, low density of groups increases the legitimacy of the organisations that exist. Yet as more organisations form, competition for resources means some groups cease to exist.[14]
Political opportunity
Political opportunity is a third theory advanced to explain pressure group formation, noting that group formation depends on the political environment. In this framework, favourable political conditions prompt advocacy groups to form. For example, changes of government or the election of new parties or politicians with distinctive political views can provide the impetus for groups to form to support the ideas of those elected. Political opportunity also includes structural factors, like the openness of institutions to lobbying, litigation or other forms of political practice that provide groups with scope to try to influence government.[15]
Who joins pressure groups and why?
A variety of motivations prompt individuals to join pressure groups. Political economy and public choice theory provide insights here. In this view, special interests are interpreted as competing for economic favour in exchange for political power.[16] As decision-makers are seen as utilitarian, they weigh options based on resources and group power. In turn, joining a pressure group is viewed as a transaction: groups provide personal incentives to potential group members, and group members provide legitimacy for the group.
While theories of public choice and economics do not explain all pressure groups, these dimensions are significant to understanding pressure groups in politics and policy in contemporary Australia – particularly those with vested interests, such as organised labour and capital. However, there are also other groups that advocate for other citizens, for example, by seeking to address structural inequalities in society. They act, or can be seen to act, altruistically to address inclusion and representation for a diverse population, which is often not well-explained by these economic models.
Incentives and exchange theory
Clark and Wilson identified three main categories of benefits to those who join a pressure group.
- Material benefits offer tangible advantage for the member, such as economic benefits (publications, or discounts on services and products) or improved working conditions. This is often associated with Robert Salisbury’s exchange theory, namely, that organisers offer incentives and benefits to potential members for joining.[17]
- Solidarity benefits are intangible, offering a sense of identity and community through education, involvement and participation. This also brings a collective identity, marking one as belonging to a group or standing for a cause. This, in turn, can bring status, enjoyment and social capital.
- Purposive benefits relate to the group’s purpose, such as to change a policy, promote an idea, or pursue a particular action.[18] These purposive benefits are also termed ‘expressive’ benefits, as people join to voice their values and ideals.[19]
Clark and Wilson argued that one or more of these benefits must be provided to members to either entice them to join or to remain part of the organisation. A pressure group’s continued existence depends upon members sharing in the group benefits, and group organisers extracting advantage from those members.[20]
Collective action and free riders
This leads to debates about how public-spirited pressure groups are. Mancur Olson argued that collective action was motivated by individual benefit, but a benefit not available to a person acting alone. This ‘rational choice’ approach focuses on the cost-benefit calculation of members joining groups. In this model, groups form because some individuals perceive opportunities to benefit, possibly at the expense of the others.[21] For example, a pressure group might seek a government subsidy that benefits its members, while being paid for through general taxation.
This approach also explains paradoxes in group formation: if groups produce public benefits that all can access, what is the incentive for the individual to participate? If groups become too large, some may benefit without paying the costs of the group. This problem of ‘free riding’ can be seen in the way some groups attempt to restrict the benefits flowing from collective action to their membership, such as when unions historically enforced ‘no ticket no start’ requirements that workplaces must employ union members.
Justice and altruism
Other scholars observe that rational choice fails to explain participation, or recognise the role of ethics, justice and morality in tempering the ‘selfish’ motivations of individuals and pressure groups.[22] The field of behavioural economics recognises that human decisions are not always based on perfect rationality, and uses insights from psychology to explore various motivations for behaviour in exchange transactions.[23] People often make decisions intuitively, automatically and emotionally, shaped by their past experiences.[24] A behavioural perspective also recognises that people seek justice for its own sake, superseding their self-interest.
How do pressure groups work?
Political scientists identified five levels at which pressure groups or citizens convey their ‘demands’ to government.
- At the most basic level, concerned individuals acting on their own accord represent interests or advocate for others.
- At the next level is spontaneous group activity where unplanned and unorganised forms of advocacy occur.
- Groups of people sharing a common trait or common concerns and values can also form non-association pressure groups’.[25] Examples include cultural groups or localised citizens who are concerned about a particular development in their town or suburb.
- Organised groups represent interests in a more sophisticated way through institutions, such as businesses, educational institutions and non-government organisations.
- Associations and specific lobbying organisations represent particular groups or advocate to influence how political, social and economic goods are distributed in explicit policy changes.[26]
Structures and roles of pressure groups
The way particular pressure groups are structured depends upon their organisation and expertise. While no single structure is common to pressure groups, typical features can be observed. Pressure groups require a spokesperson to provide media comment. Depending on the pressure group’s size, different spokespersons may handle particular policy areas. There may also beorganisational teams focused on specific areas of policy. Pressure groups are often quite geographically diverse, so regional coordination may be needed (although since the internet became widespread, this is less important). Behind the figureheads and policy teams, administrative workers keep the group running.
Because of the centralised nature of lobbying in Australia, organisations tend to be professional, concentrated in national and state capital cities, and integrated (if to varying degrees) into the policy process.[27] Differing constitutional powers means that state governments are lobbied on some issues, whereas the Commonwealth is lobbied on others. However, because of the overlap in the powers of the two tiers of government, often both levels of government will receive representations.
In their quest to change policy, pressure groups often perform three distinct roles – representation, education and scrutiny.
Representation has a number of meanings in political science, but in this chapter it refers to participation in the polity. Pressure groups represent both constituencies and issues, mostly at the same time. While representing issues is relatively straightforward, representing constituencies is more fraught. Some constituencies expect representatives to convey the demands of the majority – commonly called the ‘delegate’ model of representation. Other constituencies expect representatives to gather relevant research and information, weigh up the issues and use their own judgement to seek the best outcomes for those represented – the ‘advocate’ model of representation. Of these two models, the latter provides representatives with greater freedom of action.
Education by pressure groups also takes several directions: educating their constituency, the decision makers (such as politicians and regulators), policy advisors (in the form of bureaucrats or political staffers), and the wider community, including the media. This may entail a variety of strategies, including speaking at events, producing educational literature, writing letters and submissions to government, talking on radio and even doorknocking.
Scrutiny provides an ‘audit’ role: conducting research where necessary, ensuring politicians and bureaucrats are aware of information and arguments, making sure information used by policy makers or in the media is correct, and checking correct procedures are followed. If necessary, it means taking matters to court for judicial review.[28]
Strategies used to influence policy makers
Pressure groups use a variety of strategies to perform these roles, including:
- Direct lobbying of politicians and policy advisors.
- Indirect lobbying that aims to change government policy by lobbying people and bodies that are likely to have an influence on government decision-makers, such as political parties and the voting public.
- Agenda-setting through lobbying activities, media work, or direct communications with the public.
- Electioneering by mobilising support for or opposition to candidates or parties based on their policy positions, or influencing public opinion so that the wider public is inspired to campaign on an issue.
Some pressure groups can be more successful than other political actors in pursuing their policy agenda. For example, they have greater control over the issues they choose to pursue than political parties, which need to respond to whatever issues come onto the political agenda. Ian Marsh notes that powerful pressure groups can even come to exercise a kind of ‘veto power’ over policy change, and that it is often easier to mobilise those who are negatively affected by a policy change than it is to mobilise its potential beneficiaries. He observes:
Together, interest groups and issue movements challenge the integrating, opinion forming and agenda setting capacities of the major political parties. They do this by advancing and defending a widened and more differentiated political agenda.[29]
Yet despite the success that can result when pressure groups engage in agenda-setting and electioneering, their reliance on these strategies to influence policy rather than party politics or bureaucratic involvement can also be considered a sign of weakness. This is because policy success in these cases depends on a concerted campaign from pressure groups rather than on their integration into the policy system. Similarly, although protest can be powerful, it is a less effective form of leverage because it is often undertaken by groups without ‘insider’ knowledge or contacts, whether this is the result of a lack of resources or exclusion from consultation.[30]
A group’s choice of strategies largely depends on its resources, but also the political system and its conventions, and the goals it is pursuing.[31] A lack of power does not preclude successful lobbying by less-resourced pressure groups, particularly where a pressure group boasts experience and evidence to persuade policymakers of an argument. As a result, such pressure groups may become more formally involved in the policy system.[32]
Focusing a lobbying effort on an individual politician can also be an effective strategy for influencing policy,[33] although it can be particularly challenging in party systems where strong party discipline dominates. Although contact with a Member of Parliament is usually referred to the relevant Minister or at times to Cabinet, it can also become a ‘fast track’ to raising the issue in a policy area. [34] Of course, lobbying also involves garnering support from others, including the media.[35]
Participation and involvement in policymaking
Placing an issue on the policy agenda, lobbying and developing policy is a time-consuming process of ‘continuous contestation’. It often involves participation from a number of pressure groups to reach policy decisions. [36] Negotiation is important in policymaking, as is ongoing interaction within the policy cycle.[37] Ideally, the policy process engages local communities and an array of voluntary groups, but for decades governments have preferred to deal with one ‘umbrella’ group, rather than a number of smaller organisations.[38]
Although some political lobbying is secretive,[39] most pressure group attempts to intervene in the polity are part of broad public consultation on the public record. Pressure groups are useful to governments, offering representation, lending authority, and providing knowledge – often gathered through close involvement with the subject at hand.[40] This can assist policy bureaucrats to gather invaluable information and arguments about a particular policy before a decision is made, and is useful for policy specialists providing briefing or advice.[41] Governments use this expertise and the advice of pressure groups in policy development, [42] so engagement yields mutual benefits. It can broaden the government’s support by demonstrating stakeholder participation while pressure groups achieve attention and credibility from the wider community, and leverage to pursue their own policy priorities if the opportunity arises.
Yet some pressure groups are relegated to the periphery of the policy-making process, despite access to the bureaucracy. Access alone is insufficient; without influence, meetings are likely to be held with more junior officials.[43] Consequently, pressure groups invest considerable effort and resources to demonstrate that the broader community supports their position, and sustain their argument that their view should be taken into account by policymakers. This explains their efforts to develop public opinion which promotes their own policy concerns, and supports their claim to speak for broader sections of the community’.[44]
Groups without sectional power or economic leverage were in the past excluded from participation in policy-making by their lack of representation in policy-making institutions.[45] Restrictions on representations from particular lobbyists and pressure groups could be a calculated strategy by governments to achieve particular political outcomes.[46]
The OECD argues that a lobbying framework should include strategies to promote a ‘level playing field’. Information should be made readily available; conflicts and preferential treatment avoided, and policymakers should be accessible to the broad community and not just a privileged few, so that all voices can be considered.[47]
Insiders, outsiders, and thresholders
Wyn Grant noted that pressure groups, like many other political entities, are frequently categorised as political ‘insiders’ or ‘outsiders’ in their access to government.[48] Insiders are very close to government, and are often integrated into policy-making, while outsiders remain excluded, usually because they lack the requisite power, contacts or expertise.
Consequently, certain stakeholders are relatively subservient subjects of ‘bureaucratic citizenship’, while other groups enjoy a ‘right’ to consultation and participation in the policy process. The Australian Council of Social Services (ACOSS) is one of the few welfare or advocacy groups represented in policy advisory committees. In many ways it is an insider group, as it retains ongoing consultative status. Its lobbying role is accepted, but unlike ‘producer’ groups, ACOSS is not able to use economic sanctions to achieve a policy result, which reduces its power.[49]
Although groups are normally more able to bring about change as insiders, some pressure groups prefer to be ‘outsiders’. An outsider signals a separation from government, which affirms a philosophical commitment to an issue and provides freedom and independence to express views or pursue agendas without real or perceived censorship. While some other outsiders may respect this position, outsiders tend to be valued less by politicians – particularly if the strategy could be perceived as extreme or unlikely to affect electoral results. However, changes in societal values or recognition of the pressure group’s role and primary cause can change these perceptions.[50]
This delineation may be too simplistic, however. In the University of Aberdeen model, both insider and outsider strategies can be used by the same group, especially those who have only occasional involvement, or with limited opportunities to exert leverage (so-called thresholders groups).[51]
Communication framing and influencers
The way that issues are ‘framed’ by organisations to garner support for policy change has drawn increasing attention in recent decades. Framing refers to the way groups link interpretations of individual interests, values and beliefs with their activities, goals and ideology. The framing perspective is dominant in studying protest culture.[52]
Entman provides a useful definition of framing and its policy implications:
To select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation.[53]
When a particular event is framed as meaningful, individuals can be prompted to bring others together in collective action. Moreover, the event may serve to guide organisations and pressure groups.[54]
Throughout the last three decades as internet use became widely adopted, many pressure groups became able to use websites and social media to frame and communicate issues and mobilise people online. The internet significantly reduced the costs of recruitment and participation as public meetings, street encounters, and mailed newsletters became increasingly redundant in comparison to the low costs of internet engagement. While the internet supplemented traditional activism, it has also provided virtual spaces for exchanges and engagement.
The role of influencers has ballooned as social media use has transformed developed economies, and the social and political dimensions of this is still being understood.[55] In Australia, the political impact of influencers has been observed,[56] but requires further scholarly research. That said, it is important to note that one social world remains, encompassing both traditional and computer-mediated interactions, and digital communications do not replace real-world engagement.[57]
Why do pressure groups cease to exist?
Just as groups and movements continue to form and act in response to their context, they can also disappear if they cease to be relevant.
Mortality and salience
Recent studies of organisational mortality look at the life cycle of interest groups. Some pressure groups are not formed to last in the longer term, and cease to exist once they achieve their goal.[58] Groups that are anxious about their longer-term survival, are often less concerned about competing with other groups (a population ecology approach), and instead focus on maintaining a secure identity and purpose to endure, along with adaptive responses to changing social and political conditions.[59]
A group’s salience (prominence and suitability) is also reduced if it does not contribute to policy change and its influence is not recognised. That said, measuring influence is fraught as many intersecting factors affect the policy process – a pressure group’s contribution is one factor among many. Funding and resources both affect how a group operates, its chances for contributing to change, and its ability to last.
Funding and resources
The resources pressure groups have at their disposal vary. If a group does not have sufficient numbers to support collective action, they may require more financial resources to support their operations. Many groups have membership income, whereas others rely on patrons or donors.[60] As groups form or begin to develop, they may overcome the ‘free rider’ issue without significant expense if they have a patron.[61] A range of figures and institutions can be patrons for a group or an issue, including benefactors, celebrities, and even the state itself.
In fact, some advocacy groups have received government funding to represent the interests of those who are unable to represent themselves. Funding was mainly provided to organisations who would advocate for citizens without sufficient skills, power, resources or funds to advocate for themselves or participate in public debate. This offered a way to connect unrepresented people to government through peak bodies, helping to address inequalities in society.
A number of these organisations, including the Women’s Electoral Lobby, had funding withdrawn in the late 1990s, prompting speculation about alternatives ways of achieving representation of these social groups.[62] Some organisations, particularly those providing welfare support, appear to have replaced some of this funding through government service delivery contracts. However, these contracts included provisions preventing them from commenting on policy, so receiving the funding limited their capacity to participate in robust political debate and advocate for the interests of their members.
In the long term, an interest group needs membership rather than patronage to survive.[63] A large membership provides a foundation for small ongoing contributions and a steady income over time. Moreover, groups that heavily rely on external donors may not be as credible as representatives of their constituency.[64]
Are pressure groups good for democracy?
Within the framework public choice theory, organised interest groups can be seen as a risk to good governance. Interest groups ultimately operate from the same selfish motive: to benefit themselves, even to the exclusion of others. They behave to maximise their economic, societal and legal or regulatory conditions as they pursue their objectives in the political sphere. Political and policy decisions are attributed to the expedience and motivations of politicians and political parties, such as electoral advantage, rather than policy best practice.[65]
Ultimately, while governments determine which interests to indulge, interest group behaviour cannot be separated ‘from the surrounding institutional and cultural framework’. In other words, governments cannot always be relied upon to ensure a balance of optimal outcomes for all interests.[66] In this critique, interest groups potentially undermine good governance and the economy.
Democratic participation
More positively, Beer identified pressure group types which governments can harness to achieve superior policy outcomes. In this way, pressure groups are functional: they support, rather than destabilise governance and democracy (although Beer cautioned that special interests had the potential to ‘impair’ a political system’s action for the long-term interests of its citizenry).[67] Beer’s more optimistic approach suggests that participation, making a contribution and concern for quality of life are the values which inspire pressure group formation, rather than the more self-interested motivations of some rational choice scholars’ view of pressure groups.[68]
Beer’s interpretation recognises that pressure groups arise from various political environments. With this more ‘contextual’ perspective, each pressure group can be examined and assessed in the context of its own history and situation. In this view, collectives are motivated by the freedom of members of society to choose, as part a democratic and inclusive ‘provider’ society. Interest or pressure groups are organised representations of citizens who facilitate democratic participation. The motive to form a pressure group is egalitarian rather than selfish, as groups lobby to address disadvantage.
Of course, motivations for pressure group participation overlap at times, as those motivated by egalitarian aspirations and robust democracy realise they can benefit from involvement in pressure groups, and can foster support from others motivated by their own benefit. Few groups could be definitively categorised as singularly motivated in a polity where different organisations and constituencies represent a variety of interests. Either way, the representational role of groups is critical for connecting the governed to their government. [69] Moreover, Putnam’s characterisations of ‘bridging groups’ that interact with others, and ‘bonding groups’ that provide solidarity for a minority, can each be seen as both actors in government and society and precursors to more involved democratic participation.[70]
What kinds of pressure groups are in Australia?
Within Australia, pressure group participation is much higher than membership of political parties.[71] Pressure groups are often divided into two main camps.
- Sectional organisations represent traditional, recognised interests such as those of the labour force, business or primary industries.
- Promotional groups advance interests other than these main sectors, such as women’s interests or environmental issues.[72] However, their focus on particular issues can result in representing narrower interests than those of other political groups.[73]
Both groups prefer different styles of action and different relationships with governments or political parties.[74] Despite some complications, most pressure groups in Australia could fall easily into these two categories, although the categories may also overlap.[75]
Sectional interest groups
Sectional interest groups represent significant sections of the community and the economy, and are usually integrated into party politics and government. Some are frequently involved in policy development, often as advisors.[76] Despite a goal of representing the issues of their sector to influence policy, some sectional groups remain aligned to particular political parties, even to the disadvantage of their interests.[77]
Sectional interests represent a fixed clientele,[78] and professional groups tend to be well-resourced sectional interests. Somewhat less resourced are producer groups who generate goods or services. This includes unions, which represent the interests of labour. Welfare state provider groups include organisations such as the Australian Council of Social Services, which represents and lobbies on behalf of community and welfare organisations. Welfare state client groups are more inclined to represent groups of individuals who are clientele of the welfare provider groups. When banded together, conglomerations of interests may be called ‘collectivist’ pressure groups.[79]
Such groups prefer to lobby government through direct contact and raising awareness in the community, and typically defend their own particular interests. Labour organisations, business interests, primary producers’ associations, professional and consumer associations are all characterised as sectional interests. Groups representing localised issues, migrant and Aboriginal organisations and churches are also typical sectional interests.[80]
The major sectional interest organisations operate under established conventions of participating in the policy-making process. Large sectional organisations such as the Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the National Farmers’ Federation, and the Australian Council of Trade Unions are involved in the policy process, and often represented on government advisory committees. Sectional groups often employ highly qualified individuals to act for them; businesses frequently recruit former senior public servants for such roles.[81] In fact, business groups are significant sectional interests representing their views to government in Australia. The business lobby tends to be privileged because its resources, significant sectional interests and its production capability afford it power in a market-based economy, described as structural power.[82] Despite the influence of business and the ‘inequality of resources’ which prevents an even contest, it is possible for smaller pressure groups to triumph by achieving minority interests over majority public opinion.[83]
It can be difficult for sectional organisations to reach agreement on contentious issues. Smaller, possibly more autonomous groups in a sector may be more courageous, and arguably more accurate when representing the views of their particular constituency. This is because they can refuse to compromise on an issue for the appearance of unity as part of being beholden to politics.[84] In fact, some sectional groups may often promote causes that are not directly related to the interests of their members.[85]
Peak bodies
Peak bodies are usually strong sectional pressure groups, with several democratic functions: involving those most affected by an issue in the policy process , developing the capacity of its member organisations to enter into the policy process, but also representing resource-poor sections of the community. Peak bodies represent, coordinate, inform, research, and develop policy on behalf of member organisations for their sector. Importantly, peak bodies are not service providers, though there are a number of ways in which they provide services to their members (for example, in coordinating submissions, participating in consultation processes and perhaps providing information).[86]
Peak bodies bring together a number of organisations in partnership to generate one voice speaking for the collective. For example, welfare organisations lobby individually, but ACOSS also acts as an ‘umbrella’ group for them. Peak bodies convey a strong message from the sector they represent and provide clarity for policymakers on whom to approach when consulting on issues affecting a particular sector. Moreover, governments prefer to deal with pressure groups that are able to speak authoritatively.[87]
Promotional groups and advocacy groups
Unlike sectional interest groups, promotional pressure groups are more peripheral to government policymaking, despite access to the bureaucracy. For this reason, they may use more electoral tactics.[88] Access to the bureaucracy alone is not enough to bring change; without influence, meetings are likely to be held with more junior officials.[89] Despite promotional groups appearing to succeed at the ballot box through either election of candidates, or significant portions of the voting public supporting candidates, they exert limited policy influence. This is because they are not integrated into government processes and relationships, and can be divisive for parties. That said, particular promotional groups obtained greater access to the bureaucracy during past decades due to some government agencies engaging staff who have a link to the promotional group, or with a personal commitment to the cause. [90]
Promotional groups are often more concerned with advancing a particular issue or cause. Advocacy groups are a type of promotional group that seek to raise the status or profile of a section of society seen to be disadvantaged or deprived– socially, politically or materially. Promotional groups tend to focus on causes to advance the interests of society as a whole, and speak along policy lines rather than presenting themselves as a representative.[91]
Promotional groups can be further categorised into single-issue and multi‑issue groups. This distinction is important, because promotional groups appear to be conflated as ‘single-issue groups’ by government and policymakers, when in fact their concerns can cross a breadth of matters within their cause or promotion. For example, the Women’s Electoral Lobby (WEL), which was formed ‘to change social attitudes and practices which discriminate against women’ and works to protect the rights of Australian women, could easily be dismissed as a ‘single-issue group’. However, the WEL campaigns on a number of issues of relevance to women, including ending violence against females, health and democratic participation.[92]
On a cautionary note, at times promotional pressure groups may be proxies for the more vested interests of sectional organisations.[93] For example, the Alliance of Australian Retailers was a group ostensibly opposed to the plain packaging of cigarettes because the policy would damage the business of small retailers. It was later found to be an ‘astroturf’ group (that is, a fake ‘grassroots’ organisation) as it was funded by tobacco companies Philip Morris, British American Tobacco and Imperial Tobacco Australia.[94]
Functional interest groups
All of these groups can become what is termed functional interest groups. Functional refers to pressure groups used by governments for expertise and experience in their particular area – providing a function to government. Through such recognition, these groups are empowered for their role as they represent interests, and provide and disseminate information. [95] Commonly, functional interest groups include producer groups, welfare state provider groups, welfare state client groups or professional groups, and as Australia is a federation, it can also mean states themselves are a functional interest group.[96]
While promotional and advocacy groups can, over time, become functional interest groups, some functional groups may in turn become promotional or advocacy groups and return to the periphery of interest group influence. This is because functional groups may not necessarily make much impact in the pressure group system. Those on low incomes, or unemployed, or any group with limited funds are rarely effective because the polity is dominated by more powerful and better resourced bodies. Even voting power cannot always exert influence.[97]
Other types of issue groups
Single-issue pressure groups focus on raising the profile of a single cause or issue, perhaps as part of a social movement. Fusion refers to when two or more groups or movements join for a common purpose.[98]
In the political sphere, the approach of single-issue pressure groups can be seen as a ‘thin edge of the wedge’, as they concentrate on one particular issue or one aspect of a more complicated issue, and they may not be integrated into either the party system or the machinery of government.[99] They do not become part of government processes or advisory committees. Rather, single-issue lobby groups focus on raising awareness of their particular issue so it is adopted by more powerful pressure groups or the community itself. Ultimately, single-issue groups require politicians (Members of Parliament or those contesting that role) to identify themselves as either for or against their cause, and advocate that people support or oppose the political candidate in turn. Such groups are often criticised by their opponents for a perceived or attributed negative effect on democracy, because they promote imposing a minority view on the majority – an accusation ‘levelled at non-party organisations on both the right and the left of politics’.[100] This view may be reinforced by political parties, who often dismiss the views or work of such groups. Parties are often unsettled by promotional groups, and unwilling to identify themselves with groups who could potentially deprive them of support.[101] That said, a number of single-issue groups, particularly in advocacy roles, play an important role drawing attention to an injustice or setting an agenda for policy change.
Multi-issue groups promote several, usually interconnected or themed issues. They are generally better resourced and therefore better able to promote their causes and concerns. At times, the delineation between single- and multi-issue groups is ambiguous. For example, an environmental group could be dismissed by politicians and policymakers as a single-issue group, yet such groups frequently campaign on related concerns such as greenhouse gas emissions, preservation of wilderness areas, and recycling. Similarly, the Australian Christian Lobby may engage on a number of issues including refugees, school curriculum and euthanasia, but is primarily concerned with ‘Christian principles and ethics [being] accepted and influencing the way we are governed, do business and relate as a society. We want Australia to become a more just and compassionate nation’.[102] An example of a demonstrably multi-issue pressure group campaigning on interconnected issues was GetUp!, which describes itself as an independent movement ‘combining the power of one million members, movement partners, and a central team of expert strategists’. GetUp! pursues change to a variety of government policies, yet many of the issues Getup! advocate originated from the same progressive viewpoint.[103]
Pressure groups in Australia
The breadth of pressure groups in Australia noted decades ago is still notable. There are
- interested individuals
- non-associational interest groups – people sharing a common characteristic such as race, language, or hobby, which may become political from time to time
- institutions – such as companies, media, political parties, universities and the churches
- associations – these are distinguished from institutions as they are specialised organisations designed to articulate the shared interests of their members, particularly political demands.[104]
Late last century, nearly all Australians were members of pressure groups, with representation of almost every Australian claimed by at least one group. Although Australians are rarely members of a political party, they may still be represented through pressure groups in Australia through unions and women’s groups who speak on their behalf. The pressure groups that exist show that they are vastly disparate in their power and representation. There is a deficiency of pressure groups serving women, First Nations people, and welfare recipients, and the latter two suffer a history of policy neglect.[105]
Conflict between groups in a sector may at times prompt problems accessing the bureaucracy. Faced with limitations, bureaucrats may at times ‘discriminate according to their own feeling or interest, either in favour of or at the expense of the client’.[106] Conflicting groups and differing approaches means some pressure groups therefore do not receive the audience they seek. At times, socially distanced groups affected by government policy without the power or resources to participate in public debate (such as geographically diverse minorities or electorally unpopular bodies) were funded by government to ‘bridge the gap’. This allowed those who were otherwise unrepresented to participate in public debate, but in 1996 a number of these organisations were defunded.[107]
Conclusions
While the political sphere undergoes change from digital disruption and disaffection with democracy, pressure groups and social movements form an important conduit for making sure citizens’ voices are heard and reflected in policy. Theories of pressure group formation can help explain why some groups emerge and last. An individual’s decision to join a pressure group or social movement can be influenced by a variety of factors, but collective action is effective in bringing about change. Groups’ roles of representation, education and scrutiny are used differently by groups who employ insider and outsider strategies. Whether they are political insiders or outsiders, they can use either or both kinds of strategies to exercise influence.
Some groups and movements cease to exist after achieving their purpose, or perhaps due to the declining salience of the issues on which they are focused, or a lack of funding and resources. In any case, groups often make important contributions to democracy in the policymaking process – particularly large sectional interests and peak bodies. Promotional and advocacy groups may not have the same involvement, but often serve as functional interests. Issue groups and social movements may interact less with the political sphere, but they still make a contribution to democracy by providing the means for citizens to engage in societal change.
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About the author
Dr Moira Byrne works as a strategic advisor in an independent Australian government agency. A former policy analyst and speechwriter, her research interests include lobby groups in politics and policy, democracy, and political communication. With qualifications in theology and economics, she is also a keen observer of the intersection of religion and politics.
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