20 Local government
Roberta Ryan and Alex Lawrie
Key terms/names
amalgamation, local government, multi-level governance, outsourcing, own-source revenue, performance management, place shaping, public–private partnership, public value, service delivery, subsidiarity
Local governments[1] operate within and respond to unique regulatory contexts and circumstances, and mould the socio-economic development of the places they govern. Within Australia, the legislative foundations of local governments and their characteristics, governance, funding and reform agendas differ across jurisdictions. While this diversity makes it difficult to develop a shared understanding, a range of common challenges shape local governance.
This chapter reviews some of the contemporary challenges facing Australian local governments. It begins with a discussion of the legislative foundations and selected characteristics of local governments across Australia, their governance and funding, and recent reform agendas. Next, public service delivery is considered, and the emergence of place shaping as a concept guiding local governments in the delivery of public services is examined. The chapter then discusses a range of challenges for local governments in meeting rising community expectations of public services and an expanded service-delivery task. Frameworks and methods for measuring local government service-delivery performance are then presented. Finally, the chapter concludes with a brief discussion applying the concept of public value to the evolving service-delivery task of Australian local governments.
Local government and Australia’s system of government
Australia is a federation with three levels of government: Commonwealth (national), state and territory (regional) and local governments. However, only the Commonwealth and state governments enjoy constitutional status. Australia’s system of local government is established through the separate constitutions by some state and territory governments and regulated by state parliaments. Local governments are essentially ‘creatures of state governments’.[2]
A 1988 referendum to recognise local government in the Commonwealth Constitution was defeated, and campaigns for another referendum, including a strong effort led by the Rudd Commonwealth Government in 2013, have not succeeded. Within National Cabinet, a forum established by the Morrison Government to replace the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) in 2020, local government is formally represented just once per year, in the annual attendance by an Australian Local Government Association (ALGA) representative as an observer of a National Cabinet meeting.[3]
Their legislative foundations mean local governments hold a somewhat fragile position within the federation. Many of their powers and responsibilities are subordinate to state and national governments, and there is often considerable overlap with responsibilities held by the states. These foundations also impose a range of restrictions on local government service delivery. For example, the legality of higher levels of government funding local government activities has been challenged in the High Court.
Local government representation in national intergovernmental forums
Over almost 30 years (1992–2020), the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) served as Australia’s peak intergovernmental forum, coordinating policy on national priorities such as education, economic reform and public health.[4] COAG served as a kind of ‘vertical’ mechanism for collaboration between levels of government, operating through regular meetings and ministerial councils and bringing together the Prime Minister, State Premiers, Territory Chief Ministers, and the President of the Australian Local Government Association (ALGA).
In May 2020, the Morrison government dissolved COAG and replaced it with the National Cabinet. This shift aimed to enable faster, more flexible, and consistent decision-making in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, with regular meetings focused on practical crisis management and economic recovery. National Cabinet now serves as the main forum for Commonwealth-state collaboration on national priorities, and a representative of local government is invited to meet with National Cabinet just once each year.[5] This change has streamlined intergovernmental coordination but also narrowed formal representation for local government interests, which are no longer regularly represented through COAG’s broader, ‘vertical’, committee structure.
Since 2024, ALGA has called on the Commonwealth to reinstate ALGA as a full member of National Cabinet with ‘ongoing membership and voting rights’, in order to enable local perspectives on national decision-making to be shared, ensuring that the views of Australian communities are represented.
Number, size and type of local governments
Australia’s earliest local governments were established in Perth in 1838, Adelaide in 1840 and Sydney in 1842. These were incorporated to provide town improvement services, such as street lighting, for early colonial capitals. Other local governments started as collectives of ratepayers formed to provide services to their properties.[6] Over the next 70 years, the number of local governments grew to over 1,000. Today, there is just over half that number, although this changes as local governments are periodically reorganised by state government structural reform.[7] Local governments across Australia are typically referred to as ‘councils’, ‘cities’ or ‘municipalities’ in urban areas, and ‘shires’ or ‘towns’ in rural and remote areas. ‘County councils’ are incorporations of two or more local governments established to deliver services, such as water, across rural areas.[8]
Like Australia’s states and territories, the 537 local governments across the country vary substantially in population size, land area and economic dominance. The largest by population is Brisbane City Council, with over 1.3 million residents [9] which covers much of Brisbane’s metropolitan area. Indeed, while Australia’s cities (for instance, Sydney and Melbourne) tend to be fragmented into many smaller councils, Brisbane is the only city under one single council, and therefore also the only Australian city with metropolitan governance[10].
The largest by land area is East Pilbara in Western Australia, which covers 380,000 square kilometres, while the smallest is Peppermint Grove, which covers just 1.5 square kilometres in the inner suburbs of Perth, and, at the 2021 census, had just over 1500 residents.[11] Australia’s local governments employ more than 210,000 people across more than 400 occupations[12], and around 100 of all 537 councils are the largest or second largest employer in their local area.[13]
Most capital city councils operate under specific Acts of Parliament that provide expanded powers for these local governments.[14] For example, the City of Brisbane Act 2010 (Qld) allows the lord mayor to prepare a budget for approval by the elected council and allows councillors to be assigned a portfolio such as transport or community services. By contrast, in non-capital city councils, the general manager or chief executive officer (CEO) prepares the budget for approval by council. The City of Sydney Act 1988 (NSW) establishes voting rights for central business district businesses, whereas businesses in non-capital councils do not have voting rights.[15]
Functions and governance
The functions of Australia’s local governments expanded in the postwar era to include a more diverse and complex range of economic, social and environmental services, such as child care and youth services, libraries and aquatic centres, economic development, environmental management and community health.[16] Local councils are governed by elected councillors, who form the official governing body, and an operational executive, led by a general manager or CEO, responsible for day-to-day functions such as corporate governance and finance, community services, assets and engineering, and planning and environment. In fact, according to the 2024 National State of Assets Report, local government collectively is responsible for approximately one third of all Australia’s public infrastructure assets, including roads, buildings, facilities, airports, water and sewage, which, including land, are valued at more than $640 billion.[17]
Councils have a high degree of flexibility in the organisational structures they choose to adopt. Whilst these executive portfolio areas are fairly common, they can differ between councils. The responsibilities of councillors differ across the states and territories, depending on the legislation establishing the local government system in each jurisdiction. Generally, councillors act as formal decision makers and approve strategic plans, policies and budgets prepared by the executive. They are also responsible for appointing and overseeing the general manager/CEO’s performance in accordance with an employment contract.[18]The role and powers of the mayor tend to differ across states and territories too. For example, mayors in Queensland are mostly directly elected and have wide powers to prepare major policies and budgets. In contrast, many metropolitan mayors in New South Wales (NSW) are indirectly elected and share responsibility for major policies and budgets with councillors and general managers.[19]
Funding
Australia has a high level of vertical fiscal imbalance compared with other countries.[20]This means the level of government that collects revenue to fund services is often not the level responsible for delivering them.[21] The Commonwealth collects the most revenue from taxation (over 80 per cent) but is responsible for less than half of all public sector expenditure on service delivery.[22]
To remedy this situation, Australia uses a complex system of intergovernmental transfers to reallocate national revenues to and between state, territory and local governments.[23] A formula of horizontal fiscal equalisation is then used to ensure that, at least theoretically, all governments have the financial means to provide similar levels of service to their communities.[24]
Cost-shifting remains a major pressure on local government sustainability.[25] In NSW, the 2023–24 survey by Local Government NSW (LGNSW) reveals that councils absorbed about $1.50 billion in costs imposed by higher levels of government – approximately $490 per ratepayer, which increased by nearly 10 per cent from the previous survey period.[26] This cost-shifting results from unfunded regulatory obligations, rising emergency services levies, expanded state-mandated functions and rate exemptions. While some mechanisms (such as the Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal’s (IPART’s) rate-peg adjustments from 2024–25) theoretically provide councils with the technical capacity to recoup these shifts, they effectively make local government the tax collector for state obligations, eroding transparency and shifting the burden onto communities.
Australia’s local governments hold more than $640 billion in assets and infrastructure.[27] Local roads (38 per cent), stormwater (20 per cent), buildings and facilities (15 per cent), and waste and wastewater (14 per cent), represent the majority of local government infrastructure assets.[28] However, the amounts that local councils spend on each asset area varies depending on the different responsibilities of councils across states and territories.
Nationally, local governments collect a little more than 3 per cent of all tax revenues through rating and are responsible for about 6 per cent of total public sector expenditure on service delivery.[29] For local governments, the primary source of taxation revenue is taxes on property (called property rates). For this reason, and since state governments use different methods to calculate the land values on which property rates are based, local government revenues vary substantially across Australia. For example, South Australian local governments collect more than 70 per cent of their revenue from rates,[30] compared with around 15 per cent for the Northern Territory.[31] Other major own-source revenues include fees and charges (such as parking fines and fees for lodging development applications); rental income from properties; and grants from other levels of government.
Capital city councils that include central business districts also often have higher land values, which means they collect more from rates than other councils and can deliver more advanced services.[32] For example, Brisbane City Council operates one of Australia’s largest bus fleets, whereas state governments operate buses in other jurisdictions.[33] While own-source revenue (such as rates) comprises up to 85 per cent of a local government’s revenue,[34] this is less in rural areas where rateable land values are generally lower.
In recent decades, some state governments have capped the amount of revenue that Australia’s local governments can raise from property rates. In New South Wales, for example, the IPART sets an annual ‘rate peg’. This ‘peg’ is the maximum percentage by which a council can increase its general income from rates without requesting and receiving a special increase or ‘variation’. Generally, the rate peg serves two main purposes: first, it allows councils to automatically raise their income each year to help cover rising service costs; second, it limits how much these automatic increases affect ratepayers by preventing councils from raising their rates income by more than the estimated increase in costs. In 2023, IPART introduced a new approach to setting rate pegs, to be used from the 2024–25 financial year across NSW.[35] The revised, simpler method aims to reflect changes in the costs NSW councils face when delivering their current services more accurately, as measured partly by the annual change in councils’ base costs across three groups of councils. It also considers variations in council emergency services levies, local government election costs, and the dams safety levy.[36] The increasingly common practice of setting rate caps across all of the states and territories has been a subject of conflict between local and state governments, and some local governments have been granted special variations.[37]
Local governments also receive annual and one-off grants from higher levels of government. These grants typically make up a larger share of revenue for rural local governments.[38] A range of criteria are used to determine the grant amounts, and the formula is often the subject of conflict. Annual grants are classed as general purpose and can be used for whatever activities a council desires, while one-off grants are typically for specific purposes and can only be spent on activities defined by national or state and territory governments.
Provided under the Local Government (Financial Assistance) Act 1995, the Australian Financial Assistance Grant Program has seen the Commonwealth’s provision of more than $74 billion to local governments between the fiscal years of 1974–75 and 2025–26.[39] These Financial Assistance Grants are paid in quarterly instalments to state and territory governments for immediate distribution to local governments. These grants are ‘untied’, meaning that on receipt of funds, councils are allowed to spend them according to local priorities.[40] For almost one in four councils, the grants contribute at least 20 per cent of annual operating revenue. According to ALGA, though, the value of Financial Assistance Grants, as a percentage of Commonwealth taxation revenue, has approximately halved over the past 30 years: from one per cent in 1996 to just 0.5 per cent in 2025.[41]
Reform
Reforms to Australia’s local government systems in recent decades have focused largely on structural and governance issues, such as altering administrative boundaries, amending codes of conduct and land use planning decision-making.[42] For example, in the 1990s, the Victorian government dismissed all local governments in order to redraw boundaries and drastically reduce the number of local councils. Voter discontent with the swiftness of these reforms became a major state election issue, and the government was promptly voted out of office.[43]
The process of forced amalgamation has been the most prominent (and a highly contested) form of structural reform in local government in Australia. The driving force behind amalgamation has been the proposition being that smaller local governments are inefficient. However, there is no Australian evidence to support this claim.[44] In 2008, the Queensland government halved the number of local governments; several of the amalgamated councils have since demerged. In 2015, the NSW government sought to reduce the number of local governments, but the reform process was incomplete, halted due to voter discontent, a change of state political leadership and legal challenges by local governments facing mergers. Some, such as Drew et al. (2025), argue that forced amalgamation often results in ‘smaller communities effectively becoming disenfranchised, significant transfers of wealth, loss of political and executive positions, as well as less control over local development’.[45]
In response to persistent community pressure, the NSW Parliament passed the Local Government Amendment (De-amalgamations) Act 2024, an amendment of the Local Government Act 1993, which established a clear legal framework for merged councils seeking to separate. Under the Amendment Act, an amalgamated council is allowed to prepare and submit a detailed business case to the Minister for Local Government proposing de-amalgamation. The Minister must then refer the business case to the Boundaries Commission for examination and report, and on receiving that report (which is also to be made publicly available), the minister must provide a written response to the amalgamated council, either approving or denying the holding of a referendum about the proposed amalgamation to gauge community support.[46] The first NSW council to advance under this new framework was Cootamundra-Gundagai Regional Council, which received approval, in July 2025, for de-amalgamation into two separate councils.
In Victoria, the reform agenda in local government has placed a strong emphasis on governance, integrity, capability and performance, anchored by the Local Government Amendment (Governance and Integrity) Act 2024 (the ‘Amendment Act’) and its implementing regulation, the Local Government (Governance and Integrity) Amendment Regulations 2024 (the ‘Amendment Regulations’). This reform was motivated by concerns around local government misconduct, variable councillor behaviour, and inconsistent training and codes of conduct across the 79 councils in the state. The Acts seek to address integrity risks, strengthen system-wide oversight, setting out mandatory training requirements for councillors and mayors and prescribing a Model Councillor Code of Conduct, as well as prescribing procedures for arbitration and the management of breaches of the Code.[47] The Victorian Local Government Association has been a strong advocate for the introduction of these reforms.[48]
The Tasmanian Government has sought to undertake a major reform of the local government system, initiated through their commissioning of the Future of Local Government Review by the Tasmanian Future of Local Government Board in 2023. The Review’s final report, released in late 2023, presented 37 recommendations covering governance, performance, financial, and structural reform. In response to the Review’s recommendations, the Tasmanian Government launched the Local Government Priority Reform Program (2024–26) to oversee implementation. The program focuses on strengthening governance and leadership, enhancing performance and accountability, and supporting capability-building within councils. At the time of writing this reform process has stalled.
Recent reforms in NSW and the pressure for reform in Tasmania have primarily been driven by the property development sector, which has argued that different planning rules in different local government areas create additional red tape and inefficiency in the development processes.[49] Larger local governments can promote strengthened strategic leadership capacity,[50] but this is difficult to measure or realise at times. With the exception of introducing rate capping in some jurisdictions, state governments have generally shied away from reforms that deliver a fairer share of revenue to local governments. A national review of the federation that considered the distribution of revenue and expenses between levels of government also failed to include any proposals that would rebalance tax revenues to match the increased service-delivery responsibilities of local governments.[51] The continual focus of state governments on structural reform while under-prioritising the financial basis of local government is a source of ongoing conflict in the Australian federation.[52]
Service delivery
One of the major advantages of local government is that ‘it allows public services to be adjusted to suit local needs and preferences’.[53] Ideally, local governments are established so that ratepayers who pay for local services can decide on what services they receive.
Local government and service delivery
Australia’s local governments have evolved beyond a narrow emphasis on ‘services to property’ to promote the social, economic, environmental and cultural wellbeing of the communities they govern. This has been a response to citizens’ rising expectations of public services and the devolution of service-delivery tasks from higher levels of government to local governments.[54] At the same time, local government services have become subject to increased regulatory requirements from other levels of government, particularly in core areas such as asset management, land use planning and community planning. The costs of providing and maintaining services have also increased faster than revenue.
The net effect has been that local governments now provide a wider range and higher standard of services, such as sporting, cultural and community care facilities, under increasing regulatory and financial constraints. These issues have all contributed to the vastly increased complexity of local service delivery.[55] Recently, attempts have been made to make sense of this expanded and more complex service-delivery task for contemporary local governments (see Table 1).
| Function | Services and infrastructure |
|---|---|
| Economic and community development | Operation of tourist centres and facilitiesProvision of grants to local groups to provide servicesEvents and promotions |
| Sustainable land use | Development approvalsBuilding approval and certificationManagement of public land |
| Protecting the environment | Preventing pollution or restoring degraded environmentsProviding environmental programsStrategic planning |
| Community services | Library servicesCommunity eventsAged careEarly childhood education and care |
| Public health and safety | Waste collection and managementWater and sewerage servicesPreparedness and response to natural disasters |
The ability to tailor services to meet local needs is one of the justifications underpinning Australia’s more decentralised system of local government.[56] This justification references the principle of subsidiarity, which is concerned with ensuring service delivery is assigned to the lowest level of government capable of performing the task, unless allocating to a higher level would achieve greater efficiency and effectiveness.[57] Because Australia’s local governments are closest to their communities, they have unique insight into local needs and preferences. They determine service levels according to these needs as well as state, territory and national regulatory and funding conditions. Thus, in one way, local governments act as subsidiary agents responsible for delivering services for state and territory governments. Yet, in another way, they are also legal entities with elected political bodies responsible for their communities. This creates a somewhat conflicted relationship between local government and citizens: as well as being ‘voters’ and ‘ratepayers’, citizens are also ‘customers’.
The justification for local government has been questioned on the basis that, in a globalising world, it is not possible to constitute a spatial community. Indeed, commentators have pointed to vast differences between the colonial life that existed when local government systems were established, and have argued that ‘advances in modern communications made community governments based on the village or suburb an outmoded entity’.[58] Further, because many public services are now delivered and funded directly or indirectly by other tiers of government as well as private and non-government sectors, local government is often not the only service-delivery agent in a particular area.
Other factors to consider when examining the evolving nature of local government service delivery include:
- ‘Core’ local government functions: although these differ across jurisdictions, there is an expectation that local governments should provide core services to a minimum standard before other tasks are considered. Examples of core services include building approval and certification, provision of local roads, waste collection and management, and cultural and recreation services, such as libraries.
- Services delivered in competition with other providers: for a range of reasons, local governments choose to deliver services in competition with other providers. Examples include childcare, golf courses, caravan parks and commercial car parks. These can also provide new revenue sources or generate additional revenue.
- ‘Market gap’ services: particularly in rural areas, local governments often face pressure to provide services that are economically unviable for the private sector due to small population numbers, and there are no alternative providers. Examples include medical clinics, aged care services and programs, airports, saleyards, abattoirs and cemeteries.[59]
Local government and place shaping
Place shaping is a concept that illustrates the evolving role of local governments in the context of citizens’ increased expectations of public services and an expanded service-delivery task. Place shaping helps identify the special characteristics of local places, such as neighbourhoods, so that action can be taken on economic, social and environmental fronts to enhance the quality of these places and the life of their people.[60]
The introduction of place-based community planning across Australia, such as the Integrated Planning and Reporting framework in NSW, can be viewed as an effort to help local governments reconcile competing service-delivery demands.[61] Through place-based processes, local governments take a ‘whole of council – whole of community’ view and perform a stronger role by engaging communities more deliberatively in decisions about services, models of delivery and the inevitable trade-offs required between community expectations and regulatory and funding constraints. These processes not only shape what gets delivered but also educate communities about the increasingly complex service-delivery task facing local governments. Place-based processes appear to be changing community perceptions of local government. For example, respondents to one survey identified place-based planning for the future as one of the most important functions of local governments in Australia.[62] This represents a clear departure from historical perceptions of local governments as providers of services to property.
Major challenges
In addition to the problems of a growing service-delivery task and stagnant revenue bases, major challenges facing contemporary Australian local governments include rising maintenance costs for ageing assets; shifting community needs and expectations about the role of local government in responding to economic, social and environmental problems; reluctance to change existing service-delivery models; and increasingly fragmented, multi-sector, multi-level service-delivery governance frameworks.[63]
Local government assets
Most local government assets are long-lived and not traded in markets. Even though these assets (such as local roads, buildings, facilities, airports, water and land)[64] are crucial to the economic and social vitality and everyday functioning of communities, there is a ‘massive backlog of new projects and maintenance and upgrade projects’.[65] The ALGA 2024 National State of the Assets Report estimated the replacement costs of all poor and very poor assets (constituting 10 per cent of all local government assets) to be between $50 billion and $55 billion.[66] Comrie suggests that since asset lifespans are difficult to predict, there may be ‘some uncertainty as to the reliability of local government expenses’.[67] Indeed, there is evidence that the total operating expenses of Australia’s local governments exceed their revenue and that the sector is in a net negative financial position.[68] This has led to observation by some that local government faces worsening financial sustainability and the emergence of a massive infrastructure backlog.[69]
Changing expectations: adapting to a changing climate
Addressing the impacts of a changing climate requires action by all three levels of government as well as partnerships with organisations and institutions outside of government. However, climate change poses a wide range of challenges (and opportunities) for local governments in particular. As the level of government closest to communities, councils are at the frontline of both adapting to changing conditions and contributing to mitigation efforts. ALGA highlights three key domains of impact in particular: adaptation, emissions reduction (corporate/local emissions), and the renewable energy transition. Each of these is particularly relevant to local government operations, finances, capacity, policy and governance.[70] Local governments face growing cost pressures from adaptation (infrastructure upgrade, service delivery change, increased maintenance) but investing earlier can reduce longer‐term liability and community risk.[71]
A key challenge for Australian local governments is that they lack the legal power and financial resources to fulfil this mandate effectively. With a strong reliance on rates and user fees and charges, they do not have access to the new revenue streams needed to carry out many of these tasks.[72] Another core local government service, land use planning, is also affected; it is difficult to predict the impact of climate change on a local scale, and there is ‘a lack of scientific information at a scale relevant to inform local planning’.[73] Therefore, effectively adapting to and mitigating climate change may appear beyond the existing capacities of local government, particularly in rural and remote Australia.[74]
However, a number of useful models are emerging to assist local governments to address service-delivery challenges arising from climate change. Recently, international networks, such as the C40 and Resilient Cities networks, have formed to build local capacity and drive action by facilitating knowledge exchange. Moloney and Fünfgeld also describe the Climate Change Alliances that have emerged in Victoria as good examples of local governments demonstrating their capacity to respond to climate change in the absence of clear direction and support from state and national governments.[75] Serrao-Neumann et al. also discuss three Australian local government-led public participation initiatives and note that it is important that local governments work to ensure responsibility for climate change adaptation is shared between the public and private sectors, and communities.[76]
Reluctance to change service-delivery models
Local governments design services to meet local needs. However, there can sometimes be a reluctance to change service-delivery models. The dominance of different functions performed by local governments across Australia’s states and territories also influences their capacity to alter service delivery models. For instance, social services are often amenable to delivery by non-government providers, while major infrastructure is increasingly provided through public–private partnership (PPP) models. The way services have been delivered in the past is a strong predictor of how they will be delivered in the future. There is often considerable reluctance to change how things are done due to ‘the uncertainty and management structure costs incurred with a switch of models’.[77]
Lamothe, Lamothe and Feiock suggest that ‘in complex and uncertain situations organizational inertia and incrementalism may limit local public officials’ ability to depart radically from past arrangements’.[78] This could lead risk-averse managers to prefer the maintenance of existing service-delivery models over potentially superior, but uncertain, alternatives.
Other factors that may contribute to resistance to change in service delivery include:
- concern about the costs associated with change, such as the fear that costs of finding new vendors could outweigh costs involved in managing existing contracts
- governance structures and skills, such as the structures and skills needed to manage in-house service production can be quite different from those needed to contract outside vendors
- specific jurisdictional characteristics, such as management capacity (e.g. for evaluation), management structures (especially the relationship between politicians and administrators) and the competitiveness of the market.[79]
Therefore, when analysing local government service-delivery models, it is wise to consider the history of services in a locality and the path dependency of service-delivery models, alongside the attitudes of public officials.
Fragmented governance: working in partnership
Partnerships between government and the non-government sector are not new; they stretch back to the local governments of the colonial era.[80] However, the notion of working in partnership has received growing criticism over the last couple of decades following widespread outsourcing of service delivery to private and non-government organisations. While persuasive arguments can be identified both ‘for and against the private provision of public infrastructure in contemporary local government’,[81] concerns have been raised about whether the emphasis on partnership privileges partners over the wider community.[82]
Local governments have pursued three common responses to privatisation:
- Hollowing out: declines in revenues and reductions in intergovernmental transfers have forced local governments to ‘hollow out’ their services by reducing service levels, outsourcing core service obligations through PPPs and increasing user fees.
- Riding the wave: some local governments use privatisation as a two-edged sword, harnessing the market towards public ends. As services are contracted out, local governments create markets for public services by allowing competitive bidding to drive down service costs while maintaining quality for ratepayers.
- Pushing back: often encouraged by citizen action, some local governments have pushed back against pressures to cut or privatise services. This has led to initiatives such as establishing multi-sector coalitions of citizens, non-profit organisations and government to drive service delivery, particularly in the areas of housing and economic development.[83]
Flinders has analysed local government PPPs in the UK and suggests they ‘raise a host of political issues and tensions that have largely been overlooked’. These include:
- Balancing efficiency and flexibility: PPP projects adopt a ‘buy now, pay later’ approach, creating issues for the policy flexibility of future local governments, which are constrained by the need to service payments for contracts entered into by previous governments.
- Failure to address core risks: PPPs do not solve the problems of capital-intensive service delivery as they focus more on costs and do little to address underlying revenue issues. Therefore, the risk of revenues not matching expenses stays with government.
- Complex, delegated governance: when service delivery is contracted out, it can confuse the public as to who is responsible. There can also be confusion within government when authority for decision making and managing expenditure is devolved to non-elected PPPs.[84]
Improving outcomes for local communities
A core tenet of place shaping is a strong focus on improving economic, environmental and social wellbeing. New ways of managing the performance of local governments in delivering these outcomes have also been introduced as part of place-based planning processes.[85] The core logic of performance management is that organisations and managers are given targets derived from objectives, such as promoting community wellbeing, and ‘instruments of authority or incentive’ are used to encourage staff to achieve or exceed these targets.[86]
However, while performance management systems need to connect to penalties and incentives to ensure targets affect behaviour, they must also be designed in a way that does not crowd out public interest motivations by promoting ‘gaming and cheating behaviours’.[87] This requires constant care and attention, including establishing clear links between measures, penalties and incentives as well as regular adjustments to ensure targets reflect community wellbeing.[88]
Aligning local government performance and community expectations
Citizen expectations of performance influence their satisfaction with and choice of services as well as their political voice, including who they will vote for. Expectations can be defined as ‘judgements of what individuals or groups think will or should happen under particular circumstances’.[89] These include expectations that decision-making processes will attempt to maximise expected utility, and citizen views of reasonable or desirable levels of service performance, and are influenced by factors such as:
- whether there are other agencies available to provide a service, or whether council is the only option;
- the demographics of the community;
- the geography of the area;
- the community’s willingness to pay higher rates to get more services from the local council
- the presence of a strong local business lobby;
- proximity to major towns (in the case of smaller settlements) where services can more easily be accessed.[90]
According to James, the provision of performance information by local governments affects citizen expectations of and satisfaction with local government performance: ‘Information is valuable because it helps them exercise choice as users of services through knowledge of what they expect to receive’.[91] Community satisfaction surveys are one way that Australian local governments determine citizens’ expectations and assess performance. Typically, these surveys ask ratepayers to indicate how important each service is to them, their satisfaction with what has been delivered and what they feel needs improving.[92]
Community satisfaction surveys can help local governments to identify gaps between expectations and performance and highlight areas where performance improvement is needed. Increasingly, the findings of these surveys form the basis of local government annual reports and are being fed into major whole-of-organisation service delivery review processes.[93]
Conclusions: a public value approach to local government
Australia’s local governments are increasingly important to the proper function of economies, communities and environments across the country. This is reflected in the growing diversity of their legal foundations, characteristics, governing arrangements and funding. While recent reform agendas have focused more on structural and monetary outcomes, the introduction of community strategic planning, with place shaping and performance management as guiding principles, is an exciting development that reflects the evolved role of local governments in contemporary Australia society.
As local governments assume a greater role in society, beyond services to property, they must strive to meet rising community expectations in increasingly constrained and layered service-delivery contexts. This requires new frameworks to guide their activities. Discussion of ‘public value’ has been widespread in public policy since Mark Moore developed the conceptual framework for it in 1995.[94] There is strong support for public value as a guiding principle for contemporary local governments because it is seen as enhancing service-delivery outcomes.[95] For instance, Stoker suggests a public value style is well suited to fragmented governance systems in the sense that ‘it bases its practice in the systems of dialogue and exchange that characterize networked governance’.[96] The public value framework requires public sector managers to:
- aim to create something that is substantively valuable – that is, to constitute public value;
- be legitimate and politically sustainable, in the sense that they attract enough ongoing support and resources from the authorising environment;
- be operationally and administratively feasible, drawing on available organisational and external capabilities.[97]
In contrast to the private sector, which can focus solely on monetary outcomes and creating value for private shareholders, public value emphasises a much broader range of activities valued by the public. The concept requires public managers to search for and identify economic, social and environmental goals valued by citizens, such as climate change adaptation. This necessitates constant engagement with communities and stakeholders, as well as greater recognition of the legitimacy of a wider range of stakeholders in realising these goals. For instance, procurement processes that adopt a public value orientation require an open-minded approach to identifying the best supplier for a service, regardless of whether they are public, private and/or non-government providers. This means that local governments must remain constantly attuned to public preferences and integrate these into their service-delivery activities.[98]
Public value requires commitment to new goals and ways of working that are more demanding than those that existed when local governments were established in the colonial era. As the role of Australian local governments has expanded to include services to people, they have begun moving down the public value pathway, using place-based planning and working with communities and stakeholders to identify broader goals and ways of achieving them. However, a more ambitious reform agenda is required to build the regulatory, financial, human and technical capabilities that contemporary local governments need to deliver on this commitment. This is the major challenge facing modern Australian local government.
References
Alford, John, and Janine O’Flynn (2009). Making sense of public value: concepts, critiques and emergent meanings. International Journal of Public Administration 32: 171–91. DOI: 10.1080/01900690902732731
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) (2025). Insights into Government Finance Statistics.Canberra: ABS. https://www.abs.gov.au/articles/insights-government-finance-statistics-june-2025?utm
–– (2021). Peppermint Grove. Canberra: ABS. https://www.abs.gov.au/census/find-census-data/quickstats/2021/SAL51225
–– (2018). Government finance statistics, Australia, 2017–18. Cat. No. 5512.0. Canberra: ABS. https://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/mf/5512.0
Australian Local Government Association (ALGA) (n.d.). Facts and Figures. Canberra: Australian Local government Association. https://alga.com.au/about/local-government/facts-and-figures/
–– (2025a). Local government financial sustainability. Canberra: Australian Local Government Association. https://alga.com.au/policy/local-government-financial-sustainability
–– (2025b). Climate change. Canberra: Australian Local Government Association. https://alga.com.au/policy/climate-change/
–– (2024). 2024 National State of the Assets Report – Future proofing our communities. Canberra: Australian Local Government Association. https://alga.com.au/2024-national-state-of-the-assets-report/
–– (2018). Local government key facts and figures. https://alga.asn.au/facts-and-figures/
Bajracharya, Bhishna and Shahed Khan (2020). Urban governance in Australia: A case study of Brisbane City. In B. Dahiya and A. Das, eds (Eds.), New urban agenda in Asia-Pacific (Advances in 21st century human settlements), 229. Singapore: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-6709-0_8
Baker, Ingrid, Ann Peterson, Greg Brown and Clive McAlpine (2012). Local government response to the impacts of climate change: an evaluation of local climate adaptation plans. Landscape and Urban Planning 107: 127–36. DOI: 10.1016/j.landurbplan.2012.05.009
Benington, John (2009). Creating the public in order to create public value? International Journal of Public Administration 32(3–4): 232–49. DOI: 10.1080/01900690902749578
Brisbane City Council (2019). Public transport. https://www.brisbane.qld.gov.au/traffic-and-transport/public-transport
Brown, A.J. and Paul Kildea (2016). The referendum that wasn’t: Constitutional recognition of local government and the Australian federal reform dilemma. Federal Law Review 44(1): 143–68. Griffith University Law School Research Paper No. 16–15. https://ssrn.com/abstract=2848157
Burdess, Neil, and Kevin O’Toole (2004). Elections and representation in local government: a Victorian case study. Australian Journal of Public Administration 63(2): 66–78. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8500.2004.00379.x
Campbell, Greg (2011). Delivering local government projects: effective partnerships with the private sector. Presentation at the LGMA National Congress and Business Expo, Cairns, 22–25 May.
Cannadi, John, and Brian Dollery (2005). An evaluation of private sector provision of public infrastructure in Australian local government. Australian Journal of Public Administration 64(3): 112–18. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8500.2005.00457.x
Chandler, Jim (2010). A rationale for local government. Local Government Studies 36(1): 5–20. DOI: 10.1080/03003930903445657
Charbit, Claire (2006). Linking regions and central governments: contracts for regional development. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Publishing.
Colebatch, Hal, and Pieter Degeling (1986). Understanding local government: action, linkage, outcome. Canberra: Canberra College of Advanced Education.
Comrie, John (2013). In our hands: strengthening local government revenue for the 21st century. Sydney: University of Technology, Sydney.
Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, Communications, Sport and the Arts (2025). Financial Assistance Grant to local government. Canberra: Australian Government. https://www.infrastructure.gov.au/territories-regions-cities/local-government/financial-assistance-grant-local-government
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (2014). Reform of the federation white paper. Canberra: Australian Government.
Dollery, Brian, Stephen Goode and Bligh Grant (2010). Structural reform of local government in Australia: a sustainable amalgamation model for country councils. Space and Polity 14(3): 289–304. DOI: 10.1080/13562576.2010.532979
Dollery, Brian, and Bligh Grant (2010). Economic efficiency versus local democracy? An evaluation of structural change and local democracy in Australian local government. Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics 23(1): 1–20. DOI: 10.1177/02601079X11002300102
Drew, Joseph, Yunji Kim and Brian Dollery (2025). Mission impossible? Explaining de-amalgamation success through heresthetic, rhetoric and opportunity costs. Public Administration Quarterly, Advance online publication. https://doi.org/10.1177/07349149251322066
Drew, Joseph, Michael Kortt and Brian Dollery (2012). Economies of scale and local government expenditure: evidence from Australia. Administration and Society 46 (6): 632–53 DOI: 10.1177/0095399712469191
Flinders, Matthew (2005). The politics of public–private partnerships. BJPIR: Journal of the Political Studies Association 7: 215–39. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-856X.2004.00161.x
Follesdal, Andreas (1998). Survey article: subsidiarity. Journal of Political Philosophy 6(2): 190–218. DOI: 10.1111/1467-9760.00052
Grant, Bligh, and Josie Fisher (2011). Public value: positive ethics for Australian local government. Journal of Economic and Social Policy 14(2): 1–19. DOI: 10.1080/21550085.2011.578381
Government of South Australia, Department of Housing and Urban Development (2024). Local Government Finances. https://www.dit.sa.gov.au/local-government/documents/office-of-local-government/Local-Government-Finances-Financial-Performance-and-Position-2022-23.pdf
Independent Local Government Review Panel (2012). Service delivery and infrastructure: background paper. Sydney: NSW Government.
Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (IPART) (2023). Final Report – Review of the rate peg methodology – August 2023. Sydney: Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal. https://www.ipart.nsw.gov.au/documents/final-report/final-report-review-rate-peg-methodology-august-2023
–– (2009). Comparative analysis of local government revenue and expenditure in Australia. Sydney: NSW Government.
James, Oliver (2011). Managing citizens’ expectations of public service performance: evidence from observation and experimentation in local government. Public Administration 89(4): 1419–35. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9299.2011.01962.x
Lamothe, Scott, Meeyoung Lamothe and Richard Feiock (2008). Examining local government service delivery arrangements over time. Urban Affairs Review 44(1): 27–56. DOI: 10.1177/1078087408315801
Larcombe, Frank (1978). The advancement of local government in New South Wales: 1906 to the present. Volume 3. Sydney: Sydney University Press.
Lyons, Michael (2007). Place-shaping: a shared ambition for the future of local government – executive summary. London: Office of Public Sector Information.
McKinlay, Peter, Stefanie Pillora, Su Fei Tan and Adrienne von Tunzelmann (2011). Evolution in community governance: building on what works. Sydney: Australian Centre of Excellence for Local Government, University of Technology Sydney.
Moloney, Susie, and Hartmut Fünfgeld (2015). Emergent processes of adaptive capacity building: local government climate change alliances and networks in Melbourne. Urban Climate 14: 30–40. DOI: 10.1016/j.uclim.2015.06.009
Morrison Low (2025). Cost shifting 2025: how state costs eat council rates. https://www.lgnsw.org.au/common/Uploaded%20files/Cost_Shifting/Cost_Shifting_Report_2025.pdf
Morton Consulting (2014). Local Government Association of Queensland (LGAQ) 2013 community satisfaction tracking study. Brisbane: LGAQ.
National Cabinet (2025). National Cabinet.Canberra: Australian Government. https://federation.gov.au/national-cabinet
New South Wales Electoral Commission (2019). How voting works. https://www.elections.nsw.gov.au/Elections/How-voting-works/Levels-of-government
Ng, Yee-Fui, Ken Coghill, Paul Thornton-Smith and Marta Poblet (2017). Democratic representation and the property franchise in Australian local government. Australian Journal of Public Administration 76(2): 221–36. DOI: 10.1111/1467-8500.12217
Nicholls, Sean (2017). Councils set to lose DA powers ‘to guard against corruption’. Sydney Morning Herald, 8 August. https://bit.ly/2oJwQvl
O’Connor, James (2017). The fiscal crisis of the state. New York: Routledge.
Office of Local Government (n.d.). Employment contracts. https://bit.ly/2MhbNcC
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2014). Vertical fiscal imbalance: a comparison with other federations. OECD Economic Surveys: Australia 2014. Paris: OECD.
Parliament of Australia, Senate Standing Committee on the Reform of the Federation (2011)). Australia’s federation: An agenda for reform (Chapter 3: Intergovernmental relations). Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia. https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Former_Committees/reffed/reffed/report/c03
Pollitt, Christopher (2013). The logics of performance management. Evaluation 19(4): 346–63. DOI: 10.1177/1356389013505040
Phillimore, John, and Allen Fenna (2017). Intergovernmental councils and centralization in Australian federalism. Regional and Federal Studies 27(5): 597–621. DOI: 10.1080/13597566.2017.1389723
Preston, Judith, and Jennifer Scott (2012). Meeting the climate change challenge in local government decision-making with the use of sustainable climate change adaptation modelling. Local Government Law Journal Update 17: 135–47.
Productivity Commission (2017). Productivity review supplementary paper no. 16 – local government. Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia.
Property Council of Australia (n.d.). Advocacy priorities. https://www.propertycouncil.com.au/Web/Advocacy/Advocacy_Priorities/Web/Advocacy/Priority/Our_priorities.aspx
Rablen, Matthew (2012). The promotion of local wellbeing: a primer for policy makers. Local Economy 27(3): 297–314. DOI: 10.1177/0269094211434488
Rees, James, David Mullins and Tony Bovaird (2012). Third sector partnerships for public service delivery: an evidence review. Working Paper 60. Birmingham: Third Sector Research Centre.
Ryan, Roberta, and Joseph Drew (2019). Performance monitoring in New South Wales, Australia. In Michiel de Vries, Juraj Nemec and David Spacek eds. Performance-based budgeting in the public sector, 61–77. Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan.
Ryan, Roberta, Catherine Hastings, Ronald Woods, Alex Lawrie and Bligh Grant (2015). Why local government matters. Sydney: Australian Centre of Excellence for Local Government, University of Technology Sydney.
Ryan, Roberta, and Sally Ann Hunting (2015). Service delivery review: a how to manual for local government, 2nd edn. Sydney: Australian Centre of Excellence for Local Government, University of Technology Sydney.
Ryan, Roberta, Alex Lawrie and Catherine Hastings (2014). National profile of the local government workforce. Sydney: Australian Centre of Excellence for Local Government, University of Technology Sydney.
Serrao-Neumann, Silvia, Ben Harman, Anne Leitch and Darryl Low Choy (2015). Public engagement and climate adaptation: insights from three local governments in Australia. Journal of Environmental Planning and Management 58(7): 1196–216. DOI: 10.1080/09640568.2014.920306
Spearritt, Peter (2000). Sydney’s century. Sydney: UNSW Press.
Stilwell, Frank, and Patrick Troy (2000). Multilevel governance and urban development in Australia. Urban Studies 37(5–6): 909–30. DOI: 10.1080/00420980050011154
Stoker, Gerry (2006). Public value management: a new narrative for networked governance? American Review of Public Administration 36(1): 41–57. DOI: 10.1177/0275074005282583
Victorian Local Governance Association (2024). Local Government Act Regulations reforms finalised. Richmond East, VIC: Victorian Local Governance Association. https://www.vlga.org.au/news/local-government-act-regulations-reforms-finalised
Walker, Glen, and Michael Gray (2012). Service delivery reviews in Australian local government. Sydney: Australian Centre of Excellence for Local Government, University of Technology Sydney.
Warner, Mildred, and Judith Clifton (2013). Marketization, public services and the city: the potential for Polanyian counter movements. Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society 7: 45–61. DOI: 10.1093/cjres/rst028
Watt, Peter (2006). Principles and theories of local government. Economic Affairs: Journal of the Institute of Economic Affairs 26(1): 4–10. DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0270.2006.00605.x
Williams, Iestyn, and Heather Shearer (2011). Appraising public value: past, present and futures. Public Administration 89(4): 1367–84. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9299.2011.01942.x
Worthington, Andrew, and Brian Dollery (2000). The debate on Australian federalism: local government financial interrelationships with state and Commonwealth governments. Australian Journal of Public Administration 59(4): 23–35. DOI: 10.1111/1467-8500.00177
About the authors
Professor Roberta Ryan was the director of the Institute of Public Policy and Governance and the Centre for Local Government at the University of Technology Sydney, and most recently the Executive Director of the Institute for Regional Futures at the University of Newcastle. An applied policy expert, Roberta works closely with local governments around Australia and internationally. She publishes in the fields of community engagement and local democracy, local governance, city planning and public sector evaluation. She is an advocate for the role of local government as the key enabler of places that reflect the aspirations of local communities.
Alex Lawrie was a senior researcher at the Centre for Local Government and Institute for Public Policy and Governance at the University of Technology Sydney and is a Public Policy Fellow at UNSW. Alex specialises in urban policy and has worked with many local governments on economic, environmental and social policy and service-delivery issues. He holds a Bachelor of City Planning (First Class Honours) and Master of Urban Policy and Strategy (Excellence) and is completing an International Doctor of Philosophy (Built Environment) between the University of Technology Sydney and Technical University Berlin investigating national urban policy since the Global Financial Crisis.
- Updated in 2026. Ryan, Roberta, and Alex Lawrie (2026). In Diana Perche, Nicholas Barry, Nicholas Bromfield, Alan Fenna, Emily Foley, Zareh Ghazarian and Phoebe Hayman, eds. Australian politics and policy: 2026. Sydney: Sydney University Press. DOI: 10.30722/sup.. ↵
- Larcombe 1978; Stilwell and Troy 2000. ↵
- Brown and Kildea 2016. ↵
- Parliament of Australia 2011. Also see Commonwealth–State Relations chapter, this volume. ↵
- National Cabinet 2025. ↵
- Larcombe 1978. ↵
- Dollery and Grant 2010. ↵
- Larcombe 1978. ↵
- Australian Local Government Association n.d. ↵
- Bajracharya and Khan 2020. ↵
- ABS 2021. ↵
- Australian Local Government Association n.d. ↵
- Ryan, Lawrie and Hastings 2014. ↵
- Larcombe 1978; Spearritt 2000. ↵
- Ng et al. 2017. ↵
- Australian Local Government Association 2018. ↵
- Australian Local Government Association (ALGA) 2024. ↵
- Office of Local Government n.d. ↵
- New South Wales Electoral Commission 2019. ↵
- OECD 2014. ↵
- Charbit 2006. ↵
- ABS 2025. ↵
- Phillimore and Fenna 2017. ↵
- Stilwell and Troy 2000. ↵
- Charbit 2006. ↵
- Morrison Low 2025. ↵
- ALGA 2024. ↵
- ALGA 2024. ↵
- Australian Local Government Association 2018. ↵
- Government of South Australia, Department of Housing and Urban Development 2024, 3. ↵
- Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal 2009. ↵
- Spearritt 2000. ↵
- Brisbane City Council 2019. ↵
- Productivity Commission 2017. ↵
- Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal 2023. ↵
- Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal 2023. ↵
- Worthington and Dollery 2000. ↵
- Worthington and Dollery 2000. ↵
- Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, Communications, Sport and the Arts 2025. ↵
- Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, Communications, Sport and the Arts 2025. ↵
- Australian Local Government Association 2025a. ↵
- Dollery, Goode and Grant 2010; Nicholls 2017. ↵
- Burdess and O’Toole 2004. ↵
- Drew, Kortt and Dollery 2012. ↵
- Drew, Kim and Dollery 2025, 2. ↵
- Local Government Amendment (De-amalgamations) Act 2024 (NSW). ↵
- Local Government (Governance and Integrity) Amendment Regulations 2024 (VIC). ↵
- Victorian Local Governance Association 2024. ↵
- Property Council of Australia n.d. ↵
- Independent Local Government Review Panel 2012. ↵
- Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet 2014. ↵
- Dollery, Goode and Grant 2010. ↵
- Watt 2006, 8. ↵
- O’Connor 2017. ↵
- See Walker and Gray 2012. ↵
- Colebatch and Degeling 1986. ↵
- Follesdal 1998. ↵
- Chandler 2010, 10. ↵
- Independent Local Government Review Panel 2012, 7. ↵
- McKinlay et al. 2011, 4; Rablen 2012, 303–5. ↵
- Office of Local Government n.d. ↵
- Ryan et al. 2015. ↵
- See Walker and Gray 2012, 5. ↵
- ALGA 2024. ↵
- Campbell 2011, 2. ↵
- ALGA 2024. ↵
- Comrie 2013, 9–12. ↵
- Comrie 2013, 9–12. ↵
- Dollery, Goode and Grant 2010, 81. ↵
- Based on: Preston and Scott 2012; Moloney and Fünfgeld 2015; Serrao-Neumann et al. 2015. ↵
- Australian Local Government Association 2025b. ↵
- Preston and Scott 2012, 14. ↵
- Baker et al. 2012, 135. ↵
- Baker et al. 2012, 128. ↵
- Moloney and Fünfgeld, 2015. ↵
- Serrao-Neumann et al. 2015. ↵
- Lamothe, Lamothe and Feiock 2008, 48. ↵
- Lamothe, Lamothe and Feiock 2008. ↵
- Lamothe, Lamothe and Feiock 2008, 28–34. ↵
- Larcombe 1978. ↵
- Cannadi and Dollery 2005, 116. ↵
- Rees, Mullins and Bovaird 2012. ↵
- Warner and Clifton 2013, 52–7. ↵
- Flinders 2005, 224–31. ↵
- Office of Local Government n.d. ↵
- Pollitt 2013, 347. ↵
- Pollitt 2013, 358. ↵
- Ryan and Drew 2019. ↵
- James 2011, 1420–1. ↵
- Independent Local Government Review Panel 2012, 6. ↵
- James 2011, 1431. ↵
- Morton Consulting 2014. ↵
- Ryan and Hunting 2015. ↵
- Alford and O’Flynn 2009; Williams and Shearer 2011. ↵
- See Benington 2009. ↵
- Stoker 2006, 41. ↵
- Sources: Alford and O’Flynn 2009; Grant and Fisher 2011; Stoker 2006, 46–9; Williams and Shearer 2011. ↵
- Benington 2009. ↵