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9 Media and democracy

Claire Fitzpatrick and Kurt Sengul

Key terms/names

Artificial intelligence, deliberative democracy, fake news, fragmentation, high-choice media environment, hyper-partisanship, mediatisation, mis- and disinformation, news avoidance, participatory culture, polarisation, political podcasts, political trust, public interest journalism, regulation, social media, Canberra bubble, Federal Parliamentary Press Gallery, hybrid-media system, public sphere

introduction

The relationship[1] between media and democracy has become increasingly fractured in Australia. Foundational democratic ideals, once mutually reinforcing, such as freedom of information, transparency and accountability, pluralism and diversity of opinion, and public trust are showing signs of strain. Under mounting pressure from media commercialisation, information pollution, populism and polarisation, democracy faces what André Bächtiger and John Dryzek (2024) describe as ‘diabolical times.’ They argue that the current crisis of democracy is, at its core, a crisis of public communication.

Historically, the media has served as a vital conduit of information, educating citizens about political decisions, policies, and agenda-setting processes that shape formal electoral representation. It has long be argued that an informed citizenry is vital to a healthy and well-functioning democracy.[2]  Media has famously been coined the ‘fourth estate,’ serving as a check on government authority by ensuring transparency.[3] To this end, media and democracy are irrevocably interconnected, capable of strengthening or undermining how citizens access information, engage in public discourse, and hold power to account.

In contemporary Australia, the rapidly evolving digital media ecosystem stands at a critical juncture: it could help bridge democratic divides or, conversely, intensify fragmentation and deepen existing tensions. Participatory media, such as Instagram, TikTok, and YouTube,  facilitate debate and collective opinion formation by creating dialogic spaces where individuals can encounter diverse perspectives, deliberate and actively shape civic conversations in real time. In this multilateral news ecology, citizens are no longer passive consumers of information but active participants. [4] ‘Digitised democracy’[5] allows citizens to encounter new perspectives, amplify diverse voices, respond collectively to societal issues and challenge traditional power structures. A greater diversity of voices not only broadens democratic inclusion but also reinforces the resilience of democratic institutions by ensuring that public discourse reflects a plurality of perspectives and lived experiences.

In contrast, intensified commercial pressures on Australian journalism, coupled with information pollution (including misinformation, disinformation, and conspiracy theories) are detrimental to the health of the public sphere. Scholars express growing concern about the reliability of information and the quality of deliberation in the public sphere, noting increasing polarisation and distrust. Without these foundations, individuals cannot meaningfully participate in formal political processes or in the everyday fundamental practices that sustain democratic life. The dynamic relationship between media and democracy, once stabilising, has become perilously fragile.

This chapter examines the transformation of communication and media in the 21st century, the profound challenges confronting the Australian media, and the implications of these changes for politics and democracy. It introduces readers to key concepts and theories essential for understanding the complex relationship between media and democracy, and examines the impact of emerging trends and challenges, including the rise of artificial intelligence, mis- and disinformation, and changing patterns of news consumption among citizens.

MEDIA, DEMOCRACY AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE

Globally, trust in media institutions and democracy is at a historic low[6] This trend raises important questions about the role of news media in sustaining democratic life. The phrase ‘Democracy Dies in Darkness,’ popularised by The Washington Post and originally coined by Bob Woodward, captures the enduring belief that a free and independent press is essential for transparency and accountability.[7]. Ironically, the slogan became a focal point for debate about journalistic ethics in 2017, prompting critical questions about corporate influence, editorial independence, journalistic integrity and the role of public interest media. Public interest journalism refers to reporting that prioritises citizens’ needs over commercial or political agendas, delivering accurate and impartial information essential for democratic participation. Free and independent media is equally indispensable to the public sphere because it guarantees access to reliable information, facilitates informed public deliberation and civic engagement. This commitment to serving the public interest is not only a journalistic ideal but also a democratic necessity, as it underpins the vitality of the ‘public sphere’, a space where citizens can engage in informed, inclusive and reflective debate.

The idea of the public sphere is foundational to democratic life; it is a vital space where matters of common concern are identified, articulated and contested through reflective public discourse. By enabling citizens to deliberate collectively, it provides civil society with a forum to influence political decision-making, hold power to account and sustain the legitimacy of democratic institutions. The normative concept of the public sphere was popularised by Jürgen Habermas (1991) as a realm of social life in which public opinion is formed through rational-critical debate, independent of state and market control. It remains open to contestation, revision, and change through robust civic dialogue and participatory decision-making, which foster shared identities, alliances and connections across differences.[8] The public sphere functions as a bridge between society and the state, enabling citizens to set the agenda through the free exchange of information and ideas. In practice, however, the media ecosystem faces multiple challenges that constrain its ability to fulfil these functions and its role within the public sphere.

In Australia, as in other liberal democracies, an independent media free from censorship and political interference is a key indicator of a healthy public sphere. The media serves both as a watchdog and an agenda-setter, acting in the public interest and holding power to account. Often referred to as the ‘fourth estate,’ a term originating in the 17th century, it reflects the idea that an independent press functions as a fourth pillar in the balance of power, complementing the legislative, executive and judicial branches in modern democracies. But, in order for media to retain its watchdog status, it must maintain its independence from political and financial pressures, fulfilling a public service role by uncovering corruption, fostering debate, spotlighting societal issues and compelling political leaders to respond. Across the world, the independence of the fourth estate faces significant threats as authoritarian and populist leaders restrict access, impose censorship, and seek to delegitimise journalism.[9] Reporters Without Borders’ latest World Press Freedom Index reveals that global press freedom reached a historic low.[10] If these trends continue unchecked, the erosion of press freedom will undermine democratic accountability and weaken the very foundations of liberal democracy.[11] Amid rising censorship and the resurgence of authoritarianism, the role of public interest journalism in informing citizens, holding power to account and strengthening democratic decision-making, is more critical than ever.

Mediatisation, hybridisation, high-choice 

Transformations in global media and communication systems over the past two decades have had profound implications for how power and influence are exercised in contemporary democracies. So profound have been the changes in media and political systems that the prominent media scholar Jay Blumler has suggested we have entered a Fourth Age of Political Communication, in which traditional ways of conceptualising the relationship between media, audiences and democracy are, in his words, ‘kaput’.[12] The declining influence of mass media, alongside the rise of digital, social and mobile media, has necessitated the development of new concepts, theories and vocabularies to explain and understand profound shifts in politics, institutions, democracy and the public sphere. We have developed new concepts such as mediatisation, fragmentation, polarisation, high-choice media environments and hybridisation to make sense of the transformed ways political information is now produced, distributed and consumed, as well as the weakening of traditional gatekeeping roles once held by legacy media organisations. At the same time, societies are grappling with the positive outcomes of digital disruption, including new opportunities for democratic participation, deliberation, exchange, expression, connectivity and access to information, alongside concerns about rising mis- and disinformation, declining news quality and increased political polarisation and extremism. Indeed, the decentralisation and abundance of news and information have diversified voices and empowered citizens, but scholars have expressed concern about the growing circulation of unverified information, fake news and conspiracy theories.[13] If a well-informed citizenry is a hallmark of a healthy democracy, then a decline in the quality and accuracy of information is certainly cause for concern.

While the media have always played an important role in democratic societies, the centrality of the media to the political process has increased dramatically over the past few decades. The concept of mediatisation refers to the long-term process by which media gain increasing influence and significance across all spheres of society, particularly within the political and democratic arenas.[14] One consequence of the media’s growing role in the democratic process is that political actors and parties have professionalised and adapted their communication strategies and messaging, tailoring them to the perceived demands of the media in order to gain visibility and influence. This approach is based on the assumption that citizens (voters) are influenced by the media, and that mediatisation serves as a means for political actors to gain power in contemporary democracies. Historically, legacy media such as television, radio and print served as the primary channels through which political actors employed mediatisation strategies to gain visibility and communicate with citizens. However, processes of mediatisation occur alongside other significant transformations in communication technologies, including the proliferation of digital and connective media in the twenty-first century.

The traditional media environment, once dominated by mass media platforms such as radio, television and print, has been replaced by a system in which older and newer media logics interact – what Andrew Chadwick (2017) refers to as the hybrid media system. Chadwick suggests that politics and society have been reshaped by the blending of old and new media, and that power is now exercised by those who can effectively navigate and direct information flows to their advantage. Unsurprisingly, political parties began to employ hybrid media strategies, combining traditional, digital and social media to shape public opinion, influence political outcomes, and, importantly, win elections.[15] Politicians now implicitly rely on these strategies as a central component of their communication and campaign efforts.

The rapid development of digital and communication technologies has fundamentally transformed how citizens access and consume news and information in modern democracies. Our once low-choice, top-down mass media environments have given way to complex, participatory, multi-directional information ecosystems, characterised by information abundance and high-choice[16] Legacy media institutions, such as The Australian and major metropolitan news outlets (Herald Sun, The Daily Telegraph, The Age, Courier-Mail and The Western Australian) remain powerful and prestigious. However, their traditional gatekeeping function has eroded as non-media actors now exert greater influence over information flows. Politicians can now bypass journalists to communicate directly with citizens via social media, while citizens themselves can produce and circulate political content online [17] It has also opened up new opportunities for minor political parties and independents to compete in the democratic process as they are no longer beholden to the communicative monopoly of major political parties. Consider how effective minor parties and independents such as the Australian Greens, Pauline Hanson’s One Nation and the so-called Teal Independents have utilised both social and traditional media to develop their politician brands and mobilise support. At the same time, the democratisation of communication and information technologies has enabled social and protest movements, as well as civic, advocacy, grassroots, trade union, interest and pressure groups, to gain greater visibility and disseminate their message.[18]

Politicians use social media to connect directly with their electorates, employing public relations strategies that influence citizen engagement and shape political outcomes. For example, during the 2022 Australian federal election, the major political parties employed TikTok as a campaigning tool. [19] Public expectations of political candidates that emphasise immediacy, interactivity, relatability and authenticity have been redefined by social media.[20] Performative politics, where politicians strategically blend personal and political personas, has emerged as a key communicative practice, revealing the importance of digital media strategies and their effects on the public sphere.[21]

SOCIAL MEDIA AND DIGITAL THREATS

Social media and political participation in the digital public sphere

The internet promised the democratisation of information, offering more accessible communication that could strengthen democracy by empowering the public, closing the gap between government and the governed. This new form of ‘digitised democracy’[22]  allows citizens to encounter new perspectives, amplifies diverse voices, fosters critical engagement and challenges traditional power structures. The digital public sphere,[23] mediated by online communication networks, has become increasingly dominant in shaping public discourse and framing responses to societal issues that extend well beyond formal institutional forms of politics. In this multilateral news ecology, citizens are no longer passive consumers of information but active participants,[24] or what Danah boyd describes as ‘networked publics’.[25]

Participatory culture promised easy access to democratic dialogue, where creativity flourished through memes and mashups, fostering a sense of active involvement in society. According to Jenkins (2006), its core lies in media that allows low-barrier engagement, enabling participants to share creative work within a supportive community built on trust, common values, and the belief that contributions matter. Digitally networked activism became a focal point of scholarly and public debate during the so-called Twitter  and Facebook revolutions following the 2009 Iranian elections and the 2010 Arab Spring, when social media was hailed as a vital tool for organising and mobilising, often described as a digitally networked public sphere’.[26]  Since then, new waves of digital activism such as France’s Yellow Vest movement, Fridays for Future climate justice, the Hong Kong protests, Me Too and the Women’s March, and the Ferguson-to-Floyd era of Black Lives Matter have emerged. Perspectives and tactics have shifted, with researchers noting that while social media can facilitate change, its overall impact should not be overstated.[27]

Yet, social media continues to play a pivotal role in shaping public opinion in Australia, particularly among young people, and has become a space for collective political expression (Bruns 2021). Facebook remains the leading platform for news sharing, while Instagram and TikTok dominate among younger audiences (18–24 year olds), who prefer news shared by influencers and everyday users.[28]  Users engage in what Jenkins et al. (2020) term ‘civic imagination,’ employing popular culture to frame political issues in ways that resonate with peers and affinity groups. This practice demonstrates how digital platforms not only transform political communication but also enable new forms of participatory politics in the public sphere, where engagement is creative, networked, and culturally embedded.

Case in focus –‘Not Now Not Ever’: Julia Gillard’s misogyny speech goes viral

The revitalisation of Prime Minister Julia Gillard’s landmark ‘misogyny speech’, originally made in parliament in 2012, exemplifies civic imagination in digital culture, circulating widely across platforms such as YouTube, Instagram, TikTok and Twitter, and inspiring diverse reproductions. The ABC’s original recording attracted over 3.7 million views, and ‘Gillard’ quickly ranked among the world’s top trending terms on Twitter (now X). The speech was voted Australia’s most ‘unforgettable’ television moment in 2020, surpassing even Gough Whitlam’s Dismissal speech.[29] This enduring resonance underscores the transformative power of social media in amplifying political discourse and invites a closer examination of the speech’s original rhetorical force:

Thank you very much Deputy Speaker and I rise to oppose the motion moved by the Leader of the Opposition. And in so doing I say to the Leader of the Opposition I will not be lectured about sexism and misogyny by this man. I will not. And the Government will not be lectured about sexism and misogyny by this man. Not now, not ever.

The Leader of the Opposition says that people who hold sexist views and who are misogynists are not appropriate for high office. Well I hope the Leader of the Opposition has got a piece of paper and he is writing out his resignation. Because if he wants to know what misogyny looks like in modern Australia, he doesn’t need a motion in the House of Representatives, he needs a mirror.

A decade after its initial reception in Canberra, a remixed version of the speech trended on TikTok, circulating widely in formats ranging from dance videos to novelty merchandise and even hand-washing tutorials during the COVID-19 pandemic.[30] The speech was also the inspiration of Dhambit Munuŋgurr’s radical artwork ‘Order’, now part of the NGV First Nations Art collection. The artwork depicts the Australian parliament with the Commonwealth Coat of Arms and Gillard leading Yolŋu dancers into the chamber (a metaphor for her advocacy of women’s and Indigenous rights within male-dominated power structures). The trajectory of Gillard’s speech, from its initial muted reception in 2012 to becoming a viral cultural artifact, illustrates the transformative power of social media in amplifying political messages.[31] Digital platforms not only extend the lifespan of political discourse but also recontextualise it through remixing, trending and global circulation, demonstrating how networked publics can redefine political communication over time.

Digital threats to democracy

Democracies worldwide are grappling with the challenge of navigating an increasingly complex media landscape, marked by information pollution, deepening polarisation and populism, and mounting public dissatisfaction with formal democratic institutions. Trust in mainstream media, political leaders and public service experts is steadily declining as they struggle to maintain their traditional role as reliable sources of information within liberal democracies.[32] Everyday users now have direct access to global audiences, enabling them to bypass traditional journalistic gatekeeping, engage online publics without mediation, and evade fact-checking or critical scrutiny. This dynamic has fuelled certain populist movements’ rejection of evidence, amplified the subjectivity of truth, and fostered the perception of news as mere content without referent, where anything that fails to align with personal beliefs is readily labelled as ‘fake news.’

Fake news

‘Fake news’ is defined as deceptive material circulated primarily through digital networks, deliberately created to shape public opinion or perceptions of specific topics.[33] It typically refers to text, audio or video that presents itself as news but is intentionally and verifiably false, aiming to mislead audiences. The uncertainty surrounding the reliability of trending news, and its global circulation, reinforces scepticism toward all media, contributing to the persistence of fake news. This dynamic reflects a broader cultural framework in which the instability of truth plays a pivotal role in the formation of news.[34] Today, the subjectivity of truth, its often-tenuous relationship with facts, and the power relations embedded within competing versions of truth are defining features of what is widely described as the ‘post-truth era’.[35] Of concern here is that the subjectivity of truth makes it increasingly difficult for society to engage in conversations based on a shared understanding of what is or is not true. This poses a threat to democratic systems, which depend on a well-informed and educated citizenry capable of engaging in rational, considered debate and making decisions grounded in accurate and reliable information.

Information disorder

Building on this, the proliferation of disinformation, misinformation, and malinformation further destabilises democratic norms by exacerbating political polarisation and compromising social cohesion. The terms ‘disinformation,’ ‘misinformation,’ and ‘malinformation’ are commonly understood as follows: 1) Disinformation refers to intentionally deceptive content designed to cause harm or generate profit; 2) Misinformation is false or misleading content shared without intent to deceive, yet it can still cause harm and; 3)  Malinformation involves accurate information used maliciously to harm individuals or institutions.[36] The impact of false or misleading information on democracy is most readily observed in the context of electoral integrity, where it threatens to violate or undermine respect for electoral outcomes, adherence to the rule of law, tolerance of opposition, and commitment to truth in public discourse. Notable examples include the UK’s Brexit vote in 2016,[37] the Capitol Hill riots following the 2020 US presidential election,[38] and more recently, the Australian 2023 Voice Referendum.[39] The increasing sophistication of manipulative media strategies, such as data surveillance, microtargeting of voters, bots and the introduction of artificial intelligence, further complicates the issue.[40] Voter manipulation compromises the sanctity of the public sphere, thereby impacting formal democratic processes and institutions, including electoral outcomes.

POLITICAL JOURNALISM

Tuning out: news avoidance and ‘toxic politics’

Media is increasingly blamed for the polarised and toxic nature of contemporary political culture in Canberra and for undermining trust in democracy. Dissatisfaction with democracy, as tracked by the Australian Election Study (AES) reached an all-time high among voters in 2019.[41] A survey of readers conducted by Fairfax Media (now Nine Entertainment) on the state of Australia’s democracy found that respondents largely blamed the mainstream media for the country’s ‘broken democracy’. Criticisms included an excessive focus on conflict and negative news, overt partisanship, a failure to hold politicians accountable, and providing low-quality ‘clickbait’ content.[42] The four concerns seem indicative of broader public judgement. Research has found that Australians with low interest in politics and political news tend to perceive news coverage of political issues as biased, of poor quality, and overly focused on conflict.[43] Disengagement with news has emerged as a critical issue in recent years. Indeed, despite the unprecedented abundance of information in today’s news-saturated media environment, public interest in news has steadily declined over the past decade. Since 2016, Australia has seen a stark rise in news avoidance, particularly among younger audiences. The most recent Digital News Report indicates that Australians are increasingly avoiding news due to perceptions of untrustworthy or biased reporting, its negative effects on mood, and fatigue caused by the sheer volume of available information.[44]

Social media platforms amplify this problem by circulating inflammatory, contradictory and highly partisan content designed to fragment public opinion. This is not altogether surprising, the Oxford Word of the Year in 2025 was ‘rage bait’ defined as ‘online content deliberately designed to elicit anger or outrage by being frustrating, provocative, or offensive, typically posted in order to increase traffic to, or engagement with, a particular web page or social media content’. This type of divisive content negates open and inclusive dialogue, mutual respect and social cohesion, without which democracy cannot thrive.

The concept of news avoidance has become an increasingly prominent topic of discussion, as a growing number of citizens are choosing to opt out of professionally produced news – either intentionally, due to dissatisfaction or dislike of news, or unintentionally, as a result of the growing availability of alternative media content. Indeed, our high-choice media environment makes it much easier for people to simply opt-out of news and consume content that they prefer.[45] While the reasons for audience disengagement from news vary, many scholars regard news avoidance as a profound problem for democracies, as lower levels of news consumption are associated with reduced political knowledge and greater vulnerability to mis- and disinformation.[46]

The Federal Parliamentary Press Gallery

The parliament of Australia makes swathes of information available to watchdogs (journalists and the general public) and provides offices and services to media organisations. Journalists are visible everywhere in parliament. Their conduct is governed by rules and conventions set out in the Rules for media related activity in parliament house and its precinct, administered by the Usher of the Black Rod in the Senate and the Serjeant-at-Arms in the House of Representatives.[47] Both parliamentary chambers have an enclosed gallery, where Australian and international journalists photograph, live tweet and write copy about the day’s events. The Federal Parliamentary Press Gallery offices are co-located on the second level of Parliament House, on the Senate side. Accredited journalists number over 250 and, as the official website notes, since the first days of Federation journalists have shared their resources with colleagues. Despite the news imperative to break stories first, televised news can often include ‘vision’ – either footage or stills – gifted to the station by another journalist.

The two terms ‘Canberra bubble’ and ‘toxic politics’, circulating since the beginning of the decade-long leadership spills in both major parties, have been used more frequently in Australian political discourse following the revelation of serious misconduct and a culture of sexism in Parliament House, involving senior politicians and staffers. The ‘Canberra bubble,’ refers to the insular nature of Australian federal politics and the public perception that politicians and the media are disconnected from the concerns of ordinary citizens.

While the Press Gallery remains an influential feature of Australian politics and democracy, its influence has diminished over the past two decades due to the processes of hybridisation and digitalisation. Historically, politicians relied on journalists and the mass media platforms of television, radio and newspapers to disseminate their messages to the public. Today, however, politicians can bypass traditional news media gatekeepers and communicate directly with citizens through social media. At the same time, the high-choice media environment enables citizens to avoid legacy media altogether, instead turning to alternative sources of news and political information.[48] This shift is reflected in findings from the Australian Election Study (1987–2025), which show a steady decline in Australians’ reliance on television, radio and newspapers for election coverage, alongside a corresponding increase in the use of the internet as a primary source of political information.[49]

Public interest journalism

The phrase ‘Canberra bubble,’ mentioned earlier, refers to the shared assumptions, conventions, and shorthand that are said to shape political news produced by and for an elite group perceived as disconnected from public concerns. Rather than acting independently in the public interest, the media is argued to have been compromised by its emphasis on political theatre and emotional conflict over the substance of policy debate. Public interest journalism prioritises accuracy, fairness and political relevance over sensationalism or profit motives. Yet in Australia, widespread disillusionment and disengagement with news and political communication among voters highlight growing criticism that the media is failing to fulfil its democratic responsibilities.[50] Journalism in the digital era is grappling with severe financial challenges, as traditional revenue sources for news organisations have collapsed over the past two decades. The problem for newspapers – and their corporate owners – is not that news has become unfashionable, but that making money from news in a digitised environment is proving increasingly difficult. The shift to digital platforms has radically changed how news journalism is produced, distributed and consumed. Readers now access news through social media, apps and aggregators, reducing loyalty to traditional outlets and making revenue models unstable. Paywalls, memberships and crowdfunding alternatives have emerged, but these can limit access and create inequalities in information accessibility. This ongoing struggle for commercial viability, driven by market pressures and profit motives, has eroded the media’s ability to uphold public interest journalism. Yet a strong democracy depends on media that places the public interest and the voices of the demos at its core.

EMERGING ISSUES, TRENDS, AND FUTURES

Emerging issues in the relationship between media and democracy are intensifying within today’s rapidly evolving technological landscape, driven by shifting patterns of news production and consumption shaped by corporate-owned platforms, algorithms, artificial intelligence and restrictive government regulations. Australians’ reliance on social media and video-based platforms for news (such as Instagram, TikTok and YouTube) continues to grow, with younger Australians increasingly encountering information about social issues and public debates on these platforms.[51] This reliance underscores the growing influence and power of social media platforms as primary sites for news dissemination and consumption. Consequently, contemporary debates on the role of media in democracy increasingly centre on issues of data ownership, manipulation, regulation, and platform power dynamics.

In recent years, there has been growing pressure to regulate platform companies, compelling them to implement robust moderation practices and ensure transparency in their governance frameworks. Initiatives such as the Christchurch Call, developed in response to the live streaming of the Christchurch mosque attack,[52] illustrate efforts to establish cross-sector collaboration among states, corporations and civil society to curb the dissemination of violent and extremist content online. Efforts such as the Christchurch Call underscore the urgency of addressing the risks posed by extremist content and live-streamed violence, highlighting the broader challenge of safeguarding users in digital spaces. Concerns about exposure to harmful content, online safety, and mental health have prompted Australian policymakers to introduce nationwide age-based restrictions on social media access for individuals under 16.[53] This policy has ignited debates surrounding youth rights, platform accountability and the inherent tension between protecting young users and enabling their meaningful participation in online public spheres.

Case in focus – podcasting politics: The Daily Aus and listening toward democracy

The Daily Aus (TDA) is an independent, social media-first news provider co-founded by Sam Koslowski and Zara Seidler. Starting as a small team of journalists in Sydney, they set out in the early 2020s to make news accessible to their peers. Today, TDA produces ‘hard news’ for younger audiences with the same ethical standards and newsroom functions as traditional outlets, offering Australians a digestible and engaging way to access current affairs. Through platforms such as Instagram, TikTok and their popular weekday morning podcast, TDA provides context to trending stories and delivers news through short-form formats such as reels, posts and stories, as well as long-form formats via their newsletter and podcast, tailored to the preferences and consumption habits of younger audiences.

The rise of news podcasts such as TDA underscores their growing civic role, as audiences show a strong appetite for digital audio content to stay informed and engaged with political and social issues.[54] Legacy news organisations like The Age and Sydney Morning Herald have launched deep-dive podcasts such as Please Explain, while Guardian Australia offers Full Story, further illustrating the medium’s mainstream expansion. Research suggests that listeners value podcasts for their emotional engagement, convenience and entertainment appeal.[55] The ‘emotional turn’ identified in journalism studies[56] is particularly evident in podcasting, where personalised and intimate storytelling fosters deeper audience connection with news narratives. As  Dylan Bird[57] observes:

News podcasts are playing an important role in animating democracy in Australia, with listeners seeing them as complementary to their broader news media consumption and key to their ability to engage with others on social–political issues. At a time of much consternation about the propensity of participatory digital media to harm democracy, there is good reason to see promise in news podcasting as a productive enabler of civic life.

Artificial intelligence and democratic futures

Artificial intelligence (AI) is transforming the democratic information landscape by changing how the public accesses news and political content. The Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) has identified the rise of artificial intelligence as a key challenge for the democratic process, citing the potential for AI-generated chatbots, robocalls, deepfake videos and manipulated or synthetic images and audio to mislead voters. The economics of news media is being reshaped as automated content generation introduces ultra-low-cost competitors, pressuring journalists and newsrooms. While some audiences turn to trusted legacy media, others consume free AI-curated material. AI-driven search responses reduce referral traffic to smaller outlets, threatening political coverage, diversity, and the financial stability of journalism.[58] The 2025 Digital News Report shows that as Australians become more familiar with AI-generated news, the use of AI-powered chatbots for news access is rising.[59] At the same time, emerging research indicates that audiences are critical about AI’s role in news production. There is a lot of scepticism regarding the accuracy and transparency of AI-produced content, raising concerns that greater reliance on AI in news production could further erode public trust.

While AI is often discussed as a danger or threat, it may also provide opportunities to offset some of the contemporary challenges to democracy.[60] Creative approaches to applying AI in democratic deliberation could help address emerging challenges of political polarisation and hyper-partisanship. For scholars of politics and media, the central challenge is ensuring that technological innovation reinforces democratic norms by safeguarding freedom of expression, freedom of the press, accountability and transparency, protection of minority rights, pluralism and inclusivity, and full civil society participation, ultimately securing inclusive and resilient democratic futures.

Conclusions

This chapter has introduced readers to some of the key debates, issues, concepts, and challenges confronting media and democracy in the 21st century. The profound transformations in media and communication technologies over the past two decades have fundamentally reshaped the relationship between media and democracy. The decline of mass media dominance has given rise to a media and information ecosystem defined by abundance, high choice, fragmentation and polarisation. The rise of social media has empowered citizens and opened new opportunities for dialogue, deliberation and political participation, while also presenting new challenges, including mis- and disinformation and hyper-partisanship. Yet, despite these substantial challenges, there remains cause for optimism. Trust in news among Australians remains higher than the global average[61] and Australian audiences are less polarised than those in other Western democracies. Encouragingly, after reaching record lows in 2019, public satisfaction with democracy and trust in government have been steadily rising in Australia.[62] For students of Australian politics, understanding the complex and often fraught relationship between media and democracy is central to knowing democratic life itself. To study this relationship is to confront the deeper question of what kind of democracy we value as a society, and why it is worth protecting.

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About the authorS

Dr Claire Fitzpatrick is a Communications Lecturer at Edith Cowan University, Western Australia. She specialises in Political Communications, with a particular emphasis on how deliberative democracy enables the pursuit of individual, activist, and regulatory goals.

Kurt Sengul is a research fellow in the School of Communication, Society and Culture at Macquarie University. His research specialises in political communication, populism and the far right in Australia.

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